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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past few years, concern about the issue of environmental sustainability 
has increased considerably. Closely linked to this concern is the growing disquiet 
over the increasing pervasiveness of multi-national companies, especially oil 
companies, in shaping global politics and economics. Consequently, increased 
awareness about the environment has led to calls for better management of global 
resources and for ways in which to make the corporations that benefit the most 
from the exploitation of these resources, more socially accountable and 
environmentally responsible. 
 
The oil industry continues to be at the centre of this debate. Despite the industry’s 
immense contributions to society, it is regarded as a multi-national company with 
a questionable record of environmental sustainability practices and a low level of 
accountability and transparency. In an attempt to respond to these criticisms, oil 
companies are now producing corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports; 
voluntary reports containing disclosure about their social and environmental 
sustainability activities.       
 
Against a theoretical background in which reasons were adduced to explain the 
motivation for the voluntary corporate disclosure phenomenon and a discussion of 
the oil industry’s pivotal role in the environmental sustainability debate, this 
dissertation evaluated the quality of the environmental CSR disclosure contained 
in the annual report of thirty-four multinational oil companies. The evaluation was 
benchmarked against the environmental reporting requirements of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), the only internationally recognised CSR reporting 
standards. In addition, using regression analysis, this dissertation considered the 
impact of selected corporate characteristics on the quality of individual corporate 
environmental report. Finally, the dissertation looked at the corporate governance 
implications of the quality of the industry’s environmental reporting.  
 
 iii 
The results obtained from the above tests showed a poor quality of environmental 
reporting, with only two of the six corporate characteristics having any impact on 
the quality of the sampled oil companies’ environmental reports. 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The oil industry 
In a report by the Ethical Consumer Research Association, the oil industry was 
described as ‘one of the world's least ethical industries’, presumably because of its 
reputation as the multi-national industry with the greatest singular impact on the 
environment. Its main activity is the exploitation of crude oil, a non-renewable 
fossil fuel which is converted into non-biodegradable products like petrol, plastics, 
chemical products, and pesticides, all of which are regarded as harmful to the 
environment. The industry’s activities underpin technological development and 
modern lifestyle and its impact is projected to increase over the next two decades. 
However, demand appears to be growing at a faster rate than the projected supply 
which, given the non-renewable nature of fossil fuels, could lead to major energy 
problems in the future. According to the official energy statistics of the U.S. 
Government, the industry has provided a constant rate of worldwide employment 
to about 1 million people since the 1980s. The statistics note that global demand 
for oil in 2002 was four times the quantity of newly found oil because the rate of 
discovery of worldwide oil reserves has slowed to a trickle (in 2000, there were 16 
large discoveries of oil, eight in 2001, three in 2002, and none in 2003). 
Furthermore, the world has used up about 23 percent of its total known available 
petroleum resource, with total world oil production reaching 68 million barrels per 
day in 2003 (66.7 million barrels per day in 2001) against total estimated reserves 
of 1.266 trillion. By 2025, the world demand for oil is predicted to reach 119 
million barrels per day, with huge demand increases in China, India, and other 
developing nations.   
 
Oil industry failures 
The Exxon Valdez accident in 1989 catapulted the oil industry onto the 
centrestage of global media spotlight where it continues to suffer much criticism 
for its on-going contribution to environmental risks and the resultant human health 
hazards; and for its perceived failure, generally, to promote sustainable 
environmental development. Examples of such failures include: 
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 Shell: environmental pollution and social problems in Nigeria, and its attempt 
to dump its Brent Spar oil storage platform in a deep water trench;  
 BP: in February 1991, one of its chartered oil tankers spilled 300,000 gallons 
of oil along the California coast, adversely affecting the eco-system of 
Huntingdon beach;  
 Texaco: the damage to the Ecuadorian rainforest eco-system and its indigenous 
peoples as a result of Texaco’s operations in the region. The company is 
blamed for spilling more than seventeen million gallons of crude oil and for 
discharging more than twenty billion gallons of wastewater containing 
hydrocarbons, and other toxic wastes, in the area. Texaco has also been blamed 
for polluting the Amazon River, and for the resulting health problems afflicting 
the indigenous people who depend on the river for their livelihood.  
 
Implications of the industry’s failures 
As a result of such failures and of the ensuing negative stakeholder perceptions, 
legitimacy theory suggests that the oil industry needs to display a strong degree of 
responsiveness to stakeholder concerns in order to safeguard its position and 
protect its long-term viability. Such legitimising behaviour may include improved 
and more acceptable environmentally friendly activities as well as effective 
corporate communication, particularly in the form of voluntary and statutory 
disclosure. The global importance of the industry’s operations, coupled with its 
impact on human health and on environmental sustainability makes it the ideal 
industry to study in terms of the quality of its CSR environmental disclosure. 
 
Voluntary corporate disclosure  
The phenomenon of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting constitutes 
voluntary disclosure by management, of information about a company’s social 
and environmental performance. The fact that some of this information is of a 
sensitive nature has prompted a lot of research into management’s motivation for 
voluntarily making such information public (Deegan, 2002), with most of the 
research leaning towards the systems or social oriented theories (Gray et al, 1996) 
as an explanation for managements’ motivation in this regard. The two theories 
that have been informing this debate the most, and which are regarded as 
stemming from the political economy theory (Gray et al, 1995), are the 
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stakeholder theory (Ullman, 1985; and Roberts, 1992) and the legitimacy theory 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Patten, 1992; and Lindblom, 1994). According to 
Gray et al (1996), ‘a systems oriented theory focuses on the role of information 
and disclosure in the relationship between organisations, the state, individuals, and 
groups’, advancing the notion that an organisation is influenced by, and influences 
the society in which it operates. Since most of the current studies in this field 
incline towards validating this statement, it provides an accepted explanation of 
why the various types of corporate disclosures (financial; social; environmental) 
have become an important means of influencing stakeholders who affect 
companies through their investment decisions; their buying powers as customers; 
the supply of labour; and through regulations and laws by governments and other 
regulators. In relying on the above theories as an explanation for the voluntary 
corporate disclosure phenomenon, this dissertation will seek to justify their 
relevance to the oil industry and test their degree of applicability to that industry 
based on the quality of its environmental reports. 
 
Annual Reports  
Disclosures contained in the annual reports to shareholders have been the focus of 
earlier studies by such researchers as Hogner (1982) and Guthrie & Parker (1989). 
In western free market economies, the annual report is one of the most important 
media through which companies communicate with the outside world,1 a fact that 
can be ascribed to the management structure of public companies.  Underpinning 
this structure is the agency / managerial conflict, the result of a distinction 
between the ownership and management of publicly quoted companies whose 
shares are traded on a stock exchange (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Parkinson (1993) regards the distinction as one that transfers the 
company’s affairs into the hands of qualified individuals who are equipped with 
the requisite abilities and skills for effective corporate management. The agency / 
managerial conflict has resulted in a multi-dimensional level of accountability; 
firstly by the board of directors and management to the shareholders / owners; and 
secondly, by a public company, to society in the various roles of investor, 
customer, employee, and lender of capital. Thus, by being the principal means 
                                                 
1 Other corporate media of communication include: advertising; website; other corporate 
disclosures such as stand alone social/environmental reports; event sponsorships. 
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through which companies disseminate corporate information, the annual report 
has become the yardstick for measuring corporate transparency and accountability; 
providing assurance of financial stewardship to the owners / shareholders; and 
providing the financial market and investors with a recognised basis for appraising 
its performance.  
 
Annual reports and audits 
Over the years, the traditional raison d’être of a company, which was the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth, has been enhanced by the fact that the 
financial statements contained within the annual report have been, and continue to 
be, subjected to the audit process. An audit primarily involves an independent 
review of a company’s financial performance, and a check for consistency of 
disclosure in all its different sections (Neu et al, 1998). Since corporate 
management is directly responsible for the disclosures contained in the annual 
report, the environmental reports contained therein or attached thereto, may be 
regarded as approximating a true reflection of corporate management intentions 
and are therefore a sound basis for determining the quality of responsiveness of oil 
companies to stakeholder concerns (i.e. legitimacy theory). The foregoing seeks to 
rationalise the choice of annual reports as the basis for evaluating corporate 
environmental disclosure.  
 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
GRI is an independent external reporting framework that enables organisations to 
communicate actions taken to improve economic, environmental, and social 
performance; as well as the outcomes of such actions, and future strategies for 
improvement. Though the guidelines do not govern an organisation’s behaviour, 
they help an organisation describe the outcome of adopting and applying codes, 
policies, and management systems. 
 
Establishment of GRI  
The initiative, which was convened in 1997 by the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES) in partnership with the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), was established to elevate sustainability 
reporting practices to a level equivalent to those of financial reporting 
 5 
(International Accounting and Auditing standards), while achieving comparability, 
credibility, rigour, timeliness, and verifiability of reported information. It carries 
out its work with the active participation of corporations, environmental and 
social NGOs, accountancy organisations, trade unions, investors, and other 
stakeholders worldwide; and encourages ‘organisations of all sizes and types, 
operating in any location’ to adopt the guidelines as the benchmark for their CSR 
reporting. Therefore, where an oil company is subject to more than one 
jurisdiction e.g. Royal Dutch/Shell group (see below), or operates in different 
jurisdictions with dissimilar reporting requirements, the GRI principles provide 
the requisite uniformity in reporting standards which will facilitate intra- / inter-
company comparisons of environmental reporting.  
 
Being the only internationally recognised CSR reporting standards and guidelines, 
it currently provides the much needed uniformity in environmental reporting akin 
to that provided by the international accounting and auditing standards. On this 
basis, the decision to benchmark the quality of oil company environmental 
reporting against the GRI standards may be justified.   
 
Aims and Objectives 
The primary aim of this research is to qualitatively evaluate the level of 
environmental CSR disclosure within the oil industry by assessing the extent to 
which the annual environmental reports of the sampled oil companies reflect the 
principles of the GRI standards. A secondary aim is to consider the impact, if any, 
of selected corporate characteristics on the quality of individual corporate 
environmental report.  
 
These objectives will be achieved by exploring the more acknowledged theories 
that seek to explain management’s motives for the voluntary corporate disclosures 
contained in annual reports. Further, the pivotal role of multinational oil 
companies in the environmental debate provides justification for evaluating the 
quality of their environmental reports. Thirdly, as the only currently recognised 
international CSR reporting benchmark, the GRI standards, which have been 
described as ‘essential to producing a balanced and reasonable report on an 
organisation’s environmental performance’, should provide the most objective 
 6 
basis for this evaluation and comparison. Therefore, the environmental reports of 
the sampled oil companies will be evaluated against the requirements of the GRI 
environmental reporting standards.  
 
This dissertation does not aim to provide a critique of the facts, theories, and 
issues explored therein, beyond recognising their advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of relevance and applicability to the subject of environmental reporting by 
oil companies, and to the industry’s pivotal role in the environmental 
sustainability debate. To undertake such a critique would occasion the use of 
methodology that is beyond the scope of this work.  
 
Justification 
Although there have been numerous studies on voluntary corporate disclosures in 
annual reports and some have focused on oil companies and industry, there is very 
little research exclusively on the extent to which oil industry environmental 
reports reflect the requirements of the GRI reporting guidelines. By carrying out 
such an evaluation, and by exploring how specific corporate characteristics impact 
the quality of individual oil company environmental report, it is the opinion of the 
author that, given the topical nature of, and global concern over, the issue of 
environmental sustainability, this dissertation will further inform this debate.  
 
Outline of the  dissertation 
The rest of this study is divided into five chapters as follows: 
Chapter two establishes a theoretical context for this dissertation by reviewing 
current research in the area of systems or social oriented theories as a basis for 
understanding management’s motives for making voluntary corporate disclosure.  
Chapter three explores the on-going debate about oil companies and their 
environmental impact by discussing the global role and influence of the industry 
and detailing some of the environmental and health risks attributed to it. Chapter 
four discusses the research methodology; the matrix approach to evaluating the 
environmental reports; the statistical analyses models; and the choice of corporate 
characteristics. It also discusses the limitations of the research approach. Chapter 
five analyses and discusses the results, before examining what it all means from a 
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corporate governance perspective. The conclusion and recommendations may be 
found in chapter six.   
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Chapter 2  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Overview 
The theoretical framework for this dissertation is based on a review of the current 
literature on systems / social oriented theories. Specifically, chapter two will 
review the two more acknowledged explanations for voluntary corporate 
disclosure, namely the stakeholder and the legitimacy theories. The aim is to 
establish a theoretical rationale for management’s motives in making voluntary 
corporate disclosure and thereby provide a theoretical context for the review of 
environmental disclosure within the corporate annual reports of oil companies. 
 
Reasons for corporate disclosure  
Numerous reasons have been adduced to explain the voluntary corporate 
disclosure phenomenon, including a desire to comply with borrowing 
requirements, attract capital and investors, and the desire to comply with legal 
requirements (Deegan et al, 2000); Other reasons include an awareness of the 
economic advantages of ‘doing the right thing’ (Friedman, 1962); management 
belief in being accountable which imposes a responsibility to communicate 
corporate information (Hasnas, 1998 and Donaldson & Preston, 1995); attempts to 
forestall the introduction of onerous or unfavourable laws / regulations (Deegan 
and Blomquist, 2001); desire to win particular reporting awards (Deegan and 
Carrol, 1993); the need to respond to perceived threats to the company’s 
legitimacy (Deegan et al, 2000, 2002; Patten, 1992); and the management of 
powerful stakeholder groups (Ullman, 1985; Roberts, 1992; Neu et al, 1998).  
Researching the relationship between social disclosure, public pressure, and 
profitability measures, Patten (1991) concluded that social disclosures were more 
related to public pressure and were used to address the environmental risk 
exposure faced by companies. Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, 
Patten (1992) examined the spill’s effects on the environmental disclosures in the 
annual reports of companies within the oil industry other than Exxon, in an 
attempt to explain how external events influence the corporate social disclosure 
made by companies. He observed a significant increase in environmental 
disclosure within the oil industry following the spill. Patten’s findings imply that 
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corporations react to external stimuli; in this case, a direct reaction on the part of 
oil companies to global stakeholder concern over a major oil spill. The reasons for 
such reactions are explained by the social / systems oriented theories. 
 
Social / Systems Oriented theories  
Denoted in the notion of a social contract (Shocker and Sethi, 1973; Mathews, 
1993)2, systems oriented or social theories provide a useful framework for 
investigating corporate social behaviour particularly the motives behind voluntary 
corporate social disclosure. These theories hypothesise that an organisation is 
influenced by, and influences, the society in which it operates. As mentioned in 
chapter one, the most acknowledged perspectives of the social theories are drawn 
from stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Roberts, 1992), 
and legitimacy theory (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Mathews, 1993; Patten, 1992; 
Sutton, 1993); both are based on the concept of the political economy which is 
defined by Gray et al (1996) as ‘the social, political, and economic framework 
within which human life takes place’.  
 
Political economy theory 
There are two schools of thought under the political economy theory. The 
classical school is based on Marxian principles while the bourgeois school tends 
to be associated with John Stuart Mills. In general, both schools posit that 
economic activities take place within a socio-political, institutional framework; 
thus lending more weight to the ‘triple bottom line’ contention of Elkington (1997) 
than to the traditional solely financial basis of measuring economic performance 
(Gray et al, 1995). (Also, see organisational legitimacy, below). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Mathews (1993, p. 26) defines a ‘social contract’ thus: 
“The social contract would exist between corporations (usually limited companies) and individual 
members of society. Society (as a collection of individuals) provides corporations with their legal 
standing and attributes and the authority to own and use natural resources and to hire employees. 
Organisations draw on community resources and output both goods and services and waste 
products to the general environment. The organisation has no inherent rights to these benefits and 
in order to allow their existence, society would expect the benefits to exceed the costs to society”; 
According to Shocker and Sethi (1973) ‘a social contract imposes a moral obligation on companies 
to act in a socially responsible way’. 
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Stakeholder theory 
Freeman (1984) and Gray et al (1996) define a stakeholder as any human agency 
that can be influenced by, or can itself influence the activities of an organisation. 
To Ullman (1985), the stakeholder theory is a systems-oriented theory which 
recognises the dynamic and complex nature of the relationship between the 
company and its environment; providing a justification for incorporating strategic 
decision making into the field of corporate social responsibility. His work is based 
on that of Dierkes & Antal (1985) who claim that publicly disclosed CSR 
information provides a basis for dialogue with various stakeholder groups. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that by voluntarily making corporate disclosure, 
management is responding to the concerns of, and seeking to influence its 
stakeholders (McGuire et al, 1988). Ansoff (1965) linked stakeholder theory to 
corporate objectives by describing same as the ability to balance the conflicting 
demands of the various corporate stakeholders. In order to achieve the strategic 
objectives of the firm, Freeman (1983) defines one of corporate management’s 
main roles as assessing the importance of meeting stakeholder demands, saying 
that the more stakeholder power increases, the greater the importance of meeting 
their demands. He classified the stakeholder concept into two models: a corporate 
planning and business policy model; and a corporate social responsib ility model. 
These models further illustrate just how all encompassing the definition of 
stakeholders can be.     
 
Corporate Planning and Business Policy model 
In Freeman’s corporate planning and business policy model, the term 
‘stakeholders’ refers to customers, owners, investors, suppliers, and the general 
public, whose  support for, and approval of, corporate policies are necessary for 
the corporation’s continued existence. The model focuses on the importance of 
gaining such support and approval by recognising that the behaviour of the 
various stakeholder groups could be a limitation to management’s efforts to 
optimise corporate resources within its operational environment.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility model 
Freeman’s corporate social responsibility model recognises the importance of 
external groups which may be antagonistic towards the corporation such as 
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regulatory or special interest groups like Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace. 
Thus, the model acknowledges that strategic planning must adapt to changes in 
the social demands of these non-traditional external power groups.  
 
Conflicting Stakeholder Interests 
Sturdivant (1979), showed that the interests of the different stakeholders 
conflicted by comparing the attitude towards social responsibility of managers and 
activist group leaders. Because activists demonstrated a higher belief in a 
company's mandate for social responsibility, he concluded that managers need to 
consider conflicting stakeholder interests in developing strategic corporate plans.  
Citing a Fortune magazine survey on stakeholder satisfaction, Chakravarthy 
(1986) argued that companies can attain an excellent strategic performance if they 
adopt the underlying belief that co-operation with their different stakeholders is 
fundamental for their success. In discussing the role of stakeholders other than 
investors and managers in the development of corporate financial policy, Cornell 
& Shapiro (1987) state that a company must respect the ‘implicit claims’ made to 
those stakeholders in deve loping its capital structure strategy. To the extent that 
these implicit claims e.g. uninterrupted service to customers, are inseparable from 
the company’s operations, they have an impact on its total risk. An empirical test 
carried out by Barton et al (1989) provided evidence to support Cornell & 
Shapiro’s argument. Based on the foregoing research, and on the other studies he 
reviewed, Roberts (1992) cites them as conclusive proof that stakeholder theory is 
a viable approach to predicting and explaining management behaviour. His 
empirical research into the ability of stakeholder theory to explain the CSR 
disclosure phenomenon found that measures of stakeholder power, strategic 
posture, and economic performance are highly related to levels of CSR disclosure. 
 
Regulatory and external risks 
To support their position that companies employ social responsibility activities as 
a way of reducing the risk of adverse governmental regulations on corporate value, 
Watts & Zimmerman (1978) developed a political costs hypothesis, which 
together with the stakeholder theory recognise that government can have an 
impact on corporate strategy and performance and that CSR disclosure policies 
constitute a means of satisfying government demands. This implies that 
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governments qualify to be recognised as stakeholders too, being able to impact 
corporate behaviour by introducing new and onerous regulations and laws such as 
the UK’s combined code and the US’s Sarbanes Oxley code of corporate 
governance best practice. Other forms of external intervention include civil 
protests such as organised boycotts of company products and services; and the 
loss of shareholder value as indicated by the findings of a survey carried out by 
World Resources Institute3 that some oil and gas companies could lose up to 6 per 
cent of their shareholder value as a result of environmental risks4.  
 
If, as the preceding discussion suggests, stakeholders are able to affect corporate 
behaviour in this manner, management will respond by embracing strategies to 
effectively respond to such external, and possibly adverse, stimulus (Preston & 
Post, 1975). From a corporate perspective, such action would amount to 
legitimising behaviour aimed at favourably influencing stakeholder opinion.   
 
Stakeholder management or manipulation? 
Unsurprisingly, Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) regard communication as a medium 
through which the company attempts to either alter the definition of social 
legitimacy so it conforms to the organisation’s current practices, outputs and 
values; or through which it  attempts to become identified with symbols, values, or 
institutions with a strong base of social legitimacy. This means that management 
is able to use the corporate disclosure avenue, either to manipulate stakeholders 
and avoid or limit their opposition or disapproval; or to manage stakeholders and 
gain their support and approval. Managing stakeholders involves accountability 
through communicating the company’s compliance with societal norms and 
values. Conversely, manipulating them involves employing ‘good news’ strategy, 
                                                 
3 a think tank focused on the links between environmental and financial performance, with backing 
from Friends Ivory & Sime, a UK fund manager 
4 According to the survey, Occidental, Repsol and Unocal were most vulnerable to prospective 
actions to curb climate change and growing constraints on access to energy reserves in 
environmentally sensitive areas, while Burlington, Valero and Sunoco were relatively insulated 
against environmental pressures.  Of the 16 companies surveyed, Apache, Chevron-Texaco, 
ConocoPhillips, TotalFinaElf, Repsol, Occidental and Unocal have a larger-than-average share of 
upstream reserves in environmentally important areas. However, Burlington, Eni, ExxonMobil and 
Royal Dutch Shell have relatively little exposure to such sensitive sites. Enterprise, recently 
acquired by Royal Dutch/Shell, has none of its reserves lying in these areas. (Environmental risk 
to oil units by Tony Tassell, The Financial Times, July 24, 2002 p28).  
   
 13 
championing the positive and concealing negative news about corporate 
operations that contravene societal norms. The most common medium of 
corporate communication with stakeholders and society in general is via the 
annual reports and related corporate filings. Thus, the environmental disclosure 
within the annual report, similar to the financial information contained therein, has 
become a significant medium for the dissemination of relevant corporate 
information.  
 
Corporate Disclosure 
Corporate disclosure may therefore be defined as a management strategy for 
aligning corporate objectives with society’s expectations and values. To its 
stakeholders’, corporate disclosure provides corroboration, or otherwise, of 
societal observations and perceptions about corporate performance i.e. it provides 
a means of gauging the existence and level of transparency and accountability in 
communication between a company and its stakeholders. Corroboration will earn 
the company the social legitimacy it requires to operate, possibly leading to higher 
market value, profits, and stronger competitive position. A lack of corroboration 
poses a threat to the company’s continued existence; to which management will 
respond with ‘damage control’ strategies that may include information disclosure, 
advertising, and lobbying. In recognising the diversity in the make-up of a 
company’s stakeholders, Oliver (1991) asserts that corporate reactions to the 
demands of external stakeholders are shaped by the number, amount of influence, 
and the convergence or divergence of interest of these stakeholders, while 
Lindblom (1994) uses the term ‘relevant publics’ to acknowledge that only a 
portion of those diverse stakeholders will have the power to directly affect 
corporate strategies. As such, disclosure should be aimed, primarily, at these 
relevant publics. 
 
The on-going environmental sustainability initiatives within the oil industry may 
be deemed a direct reaction to global stakeholder concerns about the industry’s 
perceived culpability for environmental pollution, abuse, and the resulting human 
health hazards as borne out by the following statement from the BP 2003 
Sustainability Report: 
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“This year, in response to external feedback, we have produced an integrated report that 
explains the relationship between environmental, social and ethical issues and our business 
strategy, including many factors relevant to the long-term future of the group. We have 
therefore given it a new title: BP Sustainability Report 2003” 
(emphasis by author).  
 
By thus responding to stakeholder concerns, oil companies are attempting to win 
over or to manipulate stakeholders by displaying legitimising behaviour which not 
only enhances the industry’s long term survival, but should also boost each oil 
company’s financial viability in the long run.  
  
Limitations of Stakeholder theory 
According to Roberts (1992), although recent studies have established stakeholder 
influence on corporate decision making, there has been no research to test the 
level of stakeholder influence on the CSR activity. Also, because of the wide 
definition of the term, stakeholder, a company may, at any point in time, be 
unable to ascertain who all its stakeholders, or relevant publics, are with any 
degree of accuracy. Consequently, it may be unable to respond to their concern as 
argued by the theory.  
 
Legitimacy theory 
Relying upon the notion of a social contract, Legitimacy theory ‘appears to be the 
theoretical basis most frequently used in attempts to explain corporate social and 
environmental disclosure policies’ (Deegan et al, 2002). According to Preston & 
Post (1975), corporate disclosures are made both in response to external events 
and in order to ensure corporate survival. Because corporate legitimacy was 
traditionally measured by the financial constraints that society imposed on a 
company, the classical economic model defined legitimacy as being market based 
(Abbot and Monsen, 1979; and Friedman, 1962) i.e. because the company’s 
primary objective is profit maximisation, competitive market forces constitute a 
form of social control to which the company must respond, if it is to achieve its 
profit maximisation objective and maintain its legitimacy. Now, legitimacy is 
being redefined to include considerations based on corporate social and 
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environmental performance (Shocker & Sethi, 1973; Preston & Post, 1975; Patten, 
1992). 
 
Organisational Legitimacy 
There are two approaches to legitimacy theory. The one focuses on the legitimacy 
of individual organisations e.g. Exxon’s reaction to the Valdez oil spill; and the 
other, based on Marxian principles, focuses on the legitimacy of the system in its 
entirety e.g. justifying the existence of a socially unacceptable company, for 
example a cigarette manufacturing company, on the basis that it creates 
employment. Legitimacy theory is founded on the concept of organisational 
legitimacy which according to Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) exists when there is 
‘congruence between an entity’s value system and that of the society in which it 
operates’. It promotes corporate viability by ensuring the necessary availability of 
capital, labour, and customers (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Singh et al, 1986), 
whilst  mitigating against possible threats such as government regulatory 
intervention that may otherwise arise  (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986) and 
against disruptive actions by discontented external stakeholders (Elsbach, 1994). 
In other words, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) consider legitimacy to be a resource 
on which an organisation depends for its long term viability. Hence, management 
strategies will consist of policies to positively influence or manipulate this 
resource to the organisation’s benefit.  A lack of congruence, referred to as a 
‘legitimacy gap’, between the two value systems amounts to a threat to the 
entity’s legitimacy and management may respond, for instance, by lobbying, 
advertising, or by voluntarily disclosing corporate information.  
 
Legitimacy gap 
According to Wartick and Mahon (1994), a legitimacy gap arises when either 
society’s expectations of corporate activities change but corporate activities 
remain the same and vice-versa, or when there is a change in both, either in 
different directions or in the same direction but with a time lag. It is argued that 
reactions to perceived gaps in legitimacy will depend on management’s perception 
of the level of acceptability that society accords its activities. A high level of 
acceptability represents a low threat while a low level of acceptability represents a 
high threat. Thus, different situations will constitute a legitimacy gap to different 
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managers, and their response to a perceived corporate threat will vary accordingly. 
This accords with Suchman’s (1995) argument that an organisation’s choice of 
legitimation and public disclosure tactics will depend on whether it is seeking to 
gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy.    
 
Gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy 
Gaining legitimacy may involve corporate attempts to overcome its ‘liability of 
newness’ (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) such as when breaking into new business 
areas. Information disseminated by management must be favourable and 
controlled, done pro-actively, and in direct response to identified threats, instead 
of a crisis situation. Thus, in an attempt to gain legitimacy for its increased 
investment in gas exploration, the oil industry disseminates information about the 
‘cleaner and more efficient’ qualities of using gas as fuel. A company wishing to 
maintain legitimacy must first identify the stakeholder group(s) that is affected by 
a situation. It would then employ tactics, such as voluntary environmental CSR 
reporting, which are aimed at influencing these ‘conferring publics’ (O’Donovan, 
2000). The decision by oil companies to annually make voluntary environmental 
disclosure may be regarded as the industry’s attempt to maintain its legitimacy in 
the face of mounting global stakeholder concern over lapses in its environmental 
sustainability practices. On the other hand, repairing legitimacy usually involves 
reacting to a crisis (damage control), or acting to pre-empt one (damage 
prevention or mitigation). The oil industry’s reaction to oil spills constitutes an 
attempt to repair its tarnished legitimacy. 
 
Change in societal norms 
Organisational legitimisation may also come about as a result of changes in 
societal norms and values. For instance, since smoking was identified as a 
possible cause of lung cancer, this terminal illness has become associated with 
cigarette manufacturers whose operations have been, and continue to be subject to 
a legitimacy threat in the form of stricter government regulations, and numerous 
multi-million dollar law suits, particularly in the US. Similarly, the oil industry 
responded to the legitimacy threat arising from greater awareness about the 
dangers of greenhouse gas emissions and increased environmental regulations, by 
introducing innovations such as the use of unleaded fuels in cars, on-going 
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research into use of alternative sources of energy, and the manufacture of more 
fuel efficient vehicles. 
 
Influencing Legitimacy 
Although legitimacy is conferred on a company by external bodies, the company 
is also in a position to influence the process (Buhr, 1998; Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975; Elsbach and Sutton 1992; Woodward et al 1996). This is the ‘political 
economy of accounting view’ (Woodward et al, 2001) which suggests a more 
proactive corporate behaviour where management attempts ‘to set the agenda’ by 
manipulating stakeholder views to management’s advantage. ‘Advocacy 
advertising’ is a good example of corporate attempt at influencing the legitimacy 
process. It involves a biased disclosure in the company’s favour. For example, an 
advertisement about the advantages of using pesticides in farming which is silent 
about its possible dangers; simply depicting them as useful in producing crops that 
are more resistant to farming hazards, thereby ensuring bumper harvests and lower 
cost to the consumer. This strategy was employed by US oil companies in the 
1970s, in reaction to the rising negative public perceptions due to the 1973 oil 
crisis. In this instance, US oil companies used an editorial style method to 
deliberately present, as an objective point of view, a message that was biased in 
their favour. Couching advertisements in traditional American values, the oil 
companies presented their position in such a way that they were able to limit the 
extent of public dissention i.e. objections to the advertisements appeared to be an 
attack on traditional American values and stakeholder objections were thus 
controlled. 
 
The foregoing suggests that corporate quest for long-term financial viability will 
cause them to react to any external stimuli that threaten the attainment of this goal. 
Such reaction constitutes legitimacy behaviour and may involve a recognised 
strategy such as voluntary corporate disclosure in annual and other forms of 
corporate reports. Other forms of legitimising strategy include advertising, 
lobbying, and event sponsorship. 
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Limitations of Legitimacy theory 
The main limitation is the insinuation that information disclosure is reactive and 
not pro-active i.e. a company releases information in response to negative 
perceptions about its activities and not out of an obligation to inform its 
stakeholders. By so doing, management falls short of true transparency and 
accountability. As a result, legitimacy theory implies that organisations with a 
negative impact on society may be able to continue in operation if their 
communication or disclosure strategy is successful enough that it is able to sway 
public opinion in their favour. Another limitation is the difficulty in predicting 
managerial response, and the form and extent of it, to a legitimacy threat (Deegan, 
2002). Furthermore, it is unclear how managers become aware of the social 
contract and community concerns although this may be shaped by the media 
agenda.  
 
Media agenda 
In spite of the popularity of the above theories, the extent of their relevance in 
explaining the voluntary corporate disclosure phenomenon may depend, indirectly, 
on the media agenda. As stated by Brown and Deegan (1998), media agenda 
setting theory advances the notion of a relationship between the relative emphasis 
given by the media to various issues and the degree of salience of these issues to 
the general public. In other words, the media are not seen as reflecting public 
opinion, but rather, as shaping them. In relation to oil companies, global 
stakeholders generally become aware of an oil spill and attendant environmental 
issues through media reports. It is the vividness and intensity of reporting that 
shapes stakeholder reactions (Deegan et al, 2002) and indirectly determines the 
extent of legitimising required on the part of the company. 
 
Commentary 
Recognition of the growing capability of the public at large to engender corporate 
change is manifested in management’s concern about negative public perception. 
Such negativity has implications for the company’s reputation, stock value, 
attractiveness to investors, and ease of access to credit facilities and may arise 
from a change in society’s values e.g. the growing anti-smoking crusade. Or, it 
may arise from the negative perception attributed to a company’s operations e.g. 
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the perceived environmental risks associated with oil exploration and production. 
The argument that corporate existence is dependent on society’s willingness to 
allow it to continue to operate (Reich, 1998) supports the notion of a social 
contract between society and corporations (Shocker and Sethi, 1973; Mathews, 
1993). Therefore, response to society’s concerns, which are seen as a threat to the 
company’s survival, will encompass legitimation strategies to change those 
perceptions into positive ones e.g. lobbying, advertising, and voluntary 
environmental disclosures. Of course, management may also be motivated to 
voluntarily disclose environmental information in its annual report based on a 
genuine desire to be accountable to its stakeholders whom it regards as having a 
‘right to know’5. In the former case, disclosure will have a positive spin as the 
emphasis is on manipulating stakeholder opinion by portraying the company in a 
good light. In other words, such reactive disclosure will be more of a public 
relations exercise and disclosure will be symbolic, probably nominal and of 
limited actual information value (see chapter 3). One can argue that such 
companies are not demonstrating true corporate accountability (Deegan et al, 
2002). Conversely, if disclosure is motivated by a desire to be accountable, it 
should contain substantive, pro-active disclosure that enhances corporate 
transparency (Woodward et al, 2001). 
 
Summary 
Similar to stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory also recognises corporate reaction 
to external stimuli. While the stakeholder theory focuses on the driving force 
behind the stimuli, legitimacy theory is more interested in the response to the 
stimuli and the media employed, or actions taken, in responding to them. It is this 
action that constitutes legitimacy behaviour and it could take the form of 
voluntary corporate disclosure, which the stakeholder theory also regards as an 
important means of corporate communication with its stakeholders. This chapter 
has attempted to provide a theoretical explanation for why companies make 
voluntary disclosure, in order to validate the importance of annual reports and to 
justify reliance on this medium of corporate communication in this dissertation. 
The next chapter will discuss the central role of the oil industry in the 
                                                 
5 Accountability theory argues that stakeholders have a right to request information (Gray et al, 
1995) 
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environmental sustainability debate in order to show how the theories discussed in 
this chapter apply to oil companies and why the quality of their environmental 
reports are significant. 
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Chapter 3 
OIL COMPANIES AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE 
 
Overview 
Chapter three extends the literature review by exploring the on-going debate about 
oil companies and their environmental impact. Since the Exxon Valdez accident, 
the issue of the oil industry’s corporate environmental responsibility has gained 
worldwide importance (Patten, 1992). There is increasing evidence that the 
industry’s operations, and the end-products from the use of energy generating 
goods such as petrol, are harmful to the environment and to human beings. This 
chapter discusses the growth of the oil industry as a global industry; the impact of 
oil companies as multi-national or trans-national (TNC) companies; the industry’s 
impact on environmental risk and non-sustainable development; and how societal 
reaction to these dangers is shaping the industry’s corporate disclosure strategy; 
all important factors in understanding why the industry is regarded as the principal 
player in the global environmental sustainability debate.  
 
A global oil industry 
OECD6 defines globalisation as a process whereby trade and investment activities 
are carried on internationally across national borders and boundaries, as opposed 
to nationally or locally. The trend towards globalisation intensified in the 1990s 
particularly because of the liberalisation of international trade regimes (e.g. GATT, 
WTO)7, the deregulation of financial markets, and the rapid changes in 
information, communication, and transportation technologies. Although it can 
lead to efficiencies in the allocation and use of natural resources as well as 
contribute to income growth and to a higher standard of living, globalisation has 
largely been blamed for the environmental damage arising from the ensuing 
growth in modern economic activities.   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 OECD = Organisation Economic Co -operation and Development. It is a group of 30 member 
countries sharing a commitment to demo cratic government and the market economy. 
7 GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; WTO = World Trade Organisation 
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Demand for Energy 
Globalisation has also been blamed for fuelling the current high and increasing 
energy demand for heating and electricity, transportation, and for manufacturing 
and production purposes; a need that has led to a corresponding increase in 
demand for the raw materials (mainly crude oil, coal, natural gas, trees, and 
nuclear power) from which energy is generated. Although most of the world's oil 
and natural gas resources are found in developing countries like Nigeria and Saudi 
Arabia (Radler, 2003), much of the financial and technological resources needed 
to develop the global oil reserves belong to the western oil companies8 of North 
America and Europe. Consequently, oil economics and politics have acquired 
global importance to the extent that many experts suspect that oil was one of the 
main reasons for the US led invasion of Iraq9.  
 
Impact of multi-national oil companies 
The emergence of oil companies as multi-nationals has made them a power-base 
in global economics and international trade, exerting an indisputable level of 
control over governments, and human decisions and lifestyles through their 
exploitation of crude oil reserves and their control of the global oil market. This is 
achieved directly through the nature of their operations (prospecting, drilling, and 
transporting of crude oil) and indirectly through marketing of the industry’s end 
products (petrol, pesticides, chemicals, and diesel). By directly exploring and 
drilling for oil, refining and processing it, and finally selling it at a petrol station,   
most of the multinational oil companies are ‘fully integrated’ companies showing 
‘a high degree of vertical integration by controlling their sources of supply at one 
end and the chain of distribution at the other end’ (Parkinson, 1993).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 ‘Shell Withheld Reserves Data to Aid Nigeria’ by Jeff Gerth and Stephen Labaton, New York 
Times, March 19, 2004 
9 Iraq accounts for 15 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves (see Table 1). Most of the 
country's acreage is unexplored, with only 2,000 wells drilled compared with 1m in similarly-sized 
Texas. With lifting costs at about Dollars 1 a barrel, Iraq is one of the world's lowest-cost 
producers (Petrel pushes for a slice of Iraq's oil action by Joanna Chung, The Financial Times, 
December 29, 2003 p19)  
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Residence and Jurisdiction issue  
The global nature of oil industry operations transcends national borders. As a 
result of elaborate and complicated corporate structures, and varied corporate 
activities that are sometimes quite distinct, it can be difficult to determine the 
jurisdiction that has overriding and ultimate ownership of all the operatives within 
a particular oil company, and by implication, the legal framework under which 
these operatives may be brought to book.  For instance, following the Sea 
Empress oil spill in Milford Haven, the Independent Newspaper (February 22, 
1996), speculating on who was to blame for the spill, carried on page 1, the 
following headline about the ownership of the Sea Empress and its cargo: 
 
“But who takes the blame? Built in Spain; owned by a Norwegian; registered in Cyprus; 
managed from Glasgow; chartered by the French; crewed by Russians; flying a Liber ian flag; 
carrying an American cargo; and pouring oil on to the Welsh coast” 
 
Another example is the Royal Dutch/Shell group structure which is in the process 
of being normalised by consolidation into one structure10. Currently, the 
company’s unusual, bi-national structure is made up of two parent companies, 
each with a distinct management board. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. of the 
Netherlands controls 60 percent of the group and Britain's Shell Transport & 
Trading Co. plc holds the remaining 40 percent stake. Group operations are 
carried on in more than 140 countries worldwide, as different and sometimes 
distinct commercial endeavours and legal personas. As a result of the above 
corporate structure, and of Shell’s diverse global operations, stakeholders may 
have difficulty in ascertaining its jurisdiction of ultimate control. In the words of 
Parkinson (1993), ‘though a parent company of a multi-national group be 
registered in a particular country in which the group has its headquarters, and 
where a majority of its shareholders are located, it is no longer appropriate to 
deem some multi-nationals as having any national loyalties’. As a consequence, 
multinational oil companies may be described as ‘borderless corporate entities’.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The new company will be called Royal Dutch Shell plc; it will be headquartered in the 
Netherlands, with a primary listing on the London Stock Exchange (Chartered Secretary, 
December 2004, page 8).  
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Oil industry and societal perception 
The adverse media and negative public perception suffered by the oil industry has 
coalesced diverse groups of individuals and governments into forming 
environmental and sustainability pressure groups like Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth, and National Wildlife Federation. Using their power as relevant publics, 
these groups are responsible for orchestrating a change in the corporate objective; 
from the traditional shareholder investment maximisation goal to a more 
prescriptive one where companies are required to act ethically by broadening their 
main objective to include responsiveness to stakeholder concerns and recognition 
of stakeholder11 interests and welfare. The above process has been made easier by 
the growth in the size of multi-national oil companies which has led to a dilution 
of their ownership. According to Keim (1978), the more distributed the ownership 
of a company, the broader the demands of these diverse owners. The implication 
is that corporate recognition of the interest of a wider stakeholder group amounts 
to an acknowledgement of the importance, not just of a company’s financial 
performance, but also of its social, political, environmental, and other  
non-financial performance; an awareness that Elkington (1997) describes as ‘the 
triple bottom line’ reporting. The shortcoming of such a prescriptive approach is 
that it is unable to predict how, and the extent of managerial compliance, if any. 
By voluntarily taking on the additiona l responsibility for communicating their 
environmental and social performance to stakeholders, management has acquired 
complete editorial control over the contents of the reports and the manner of 
disclosure. To this extent, it is difficult to determine the motivation for reporting 
and the reliability of the reports, as management may use this important medium 
of corporate communication as a means of controlling societal perception by 
making symbolic disclosures (i.e. complying with the letter of the law) which are 
not substantive (i.e. non-compliance with the spirit of the law). By thus failing to 
properly inform and be accountable and transparent, management is employing a 
‘good news’ disclosure strategy that turns the annual reports into a self- laudatory 
exercise (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996). 
                                                 
11 Stakeholders in this instance are not limited to investors and other providers of capital, but 
include governments, other regulators, customers, suppliers, employees, and others who are 
affected by a company’s operations. 
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Environmental Risk 
Environmental risk may be defined as anything that jeopardises the well being of 
the environment, arising either through air or water pollution and contamination; 
the uncontrolled mining or use of non-renewable natural resources; or as a result 
of the pursuance of processes or policies that do not promote sustainable 
environmental development. The oil industry’s environmental risk impact 
pervades the whole of the industry’s production processes, from the exploration 
stage, through the actual production stage to the effluent released from using the 
industry’s end products. Exploration can involve deforestation, forcible relocation 
of people from their land, and pollution of waterways and fragile ecosystems with 
oil waste. Pipeline and tanker spills devastate wildlife and the environment, and 
the refining of crude oil itself is energy intensive and causes a high degree of 
pollution, mostly in the form of toxic emissions to the air. Similarly, using petrol 
and diesel produces carbon gases which are toxic, and contribute to the depletion 
of the ozone layer. The industry’s environmental risk impact will be discussed in 
the context of three countries, namely Saudi Arabia which has the la rgest proven 
oil reserves in the world; Nigeria, which has the largest proven reserves in Africa, 
south of the Sahara (Radler, 2003), and Canada, which has the largest proved oil 
(conventional crude and oil sands) and gas reserves in the west (Table 1). It is 
envisaged that this approach will highlight the similarities in the environmental 
challenges faced by oil dependent economies whilst reiterating the global presence 
of the oil industry and its contributory responsibility for global environmental 
risks.    
 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is home to the largest oil reserves in the world. As at January 1, 
2004, its total reserves represented twenty percent of the global total (i.e. reserves 
of 259,400,000 barrels compared with a global total of 1,265,811,583 barrels – 
Radler, 2003). Acknowledging that environmental protection issues in Saudi 
Arabia are linked to its main industry of oil production, the US’s Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) concedes that environmental risks remain, 
despite the effect of technological advances in reducing their impact. Specifically, 
EIA admits that not only does the offshore drilling affect the integrity of the 
coastal shelf, but it also adversely affects marine life. The continuing threat to 
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Gulf ecology and environment is as a result of an increase in oil discharges into 
the Persian Gulf; and of the continuing risk of spillage from transporting oil to 
world markets via barges, super-tankers, or pipelines. EIA points out that 
pollution from offshore hydrocarbon development, and from the de-ballasting of 
oil tankers and other ships moving through the heavily trafficked Red Sea and 
Persian Gulf regions, poses a threat to the reefs located along the Saudi coast, 
even though a relative lack of precipitation, human population, inflow from rivers, 
and other natural disturbances are helping to keep the Red Sea reefs generally 
healthy. Reiterating the warning of environmentalists, the report recognises that 
offshore oil rigs contribute a significant percentage of oil spillage into the sea 
through seepages in the sea bed, cracks in rigs, illegal discharges by oil companies 
and vessels, and accidental oil spills. The EIA report further emphasised the 
warning by the Regional Organisation for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment, a leading Arab environmental organisation, that a September 1999 
die-off of fish in the northern Gulf, due to high salt level in the water and 100-
degree water temperatures, is the result of global warming compounded by 
indiscriminate dumping of wastewater in the region by oil companies, and the 
result of unchecked oil seepage.  
 
Global warming 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
defines global warming as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere 
and which, in addition to natural climate variability, is observed over comparable 
time periods.” Global warming occurs as a result of ‘greenhouse gas emissions’ 
whereby the hydrocarbons that make up crude oil release poisonous gases,12 
(mainly carbon dioxide - CO2) into the atmosphere during their conversion into 
energy, adversely affecting the atmospheric ozone layer, and causing an adverse 
change in atmospheric climatic conditions. Before the industrial revolution, US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) claims that human activity released very 
                                                 
12 Besides Carbon dioxide (CO2), these include Nitrate oxides (NOx), Sulphur oxides (SOx), 
Carbon monoxide (CO), Methane (CH4); very powerful greenhouse gases that are not naturally 
occurring include hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride 
(SF6), which are generated in a variety of industrial processes. (source: US Environmental 
Protection Agency website) 
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few gases into the atmosphere, but now through population growth, fossil fuel 
burning, and deforestation, the mixture of gases in the atmosphere is being 
negatively affected. As recently as 1996, the US Inter-governmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that, “Human activities are changing the 
atmospheric concentrations and distributions of greenhouse gases”. These changes 
produce a ‘radiative forcing’13 by changing either the reflection or absorption of 
solar radiation, or the emission and absorption of terrestrial radiation. In 2001, 
IPCC concluded that “concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases and their 
radiative forcing have continued to increase as a result of human activities”.  
 
Implications of global warming 
According to the EPA, rising global temperatures are expected to trigger major 
environmental hazards such as changes in the level of global precipitation 
(flooding in some regions and drought in others); a rise in sea levels (due to a 
decline in snow cover and sea ice); changes to agricultural productivity, migratory 
patterns, and bio-diversity. The effects of global warming are clearly visible on 
the Indian Ocean Island of the Maldives, where the entire island capital of Malé is 
enclosed within sea walls to protect it from the impending hazards of a rise in sea 
levels attributable to the change in climatic temperatures. It is estimated that the 
whole of Malé will have disappeared below sea level in one hundred years’ time, 
at the current rate of rise in environmental temperatures. Other areas affected by 
global warming include the Gobi desert in China and the Sahara desert in Africa 
which are fast encroaching on surrounding erstwhile fertile land. The global 
attempt to control green-house gas emissions gave birth to the Kyoto protocol i.e. 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change which was 
adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997. 
 
Kyoto Protocol 
However, the Kyoto protocol has been strongly opposed by the US Global 
Climate Coalition (GCC); one of the largest and most aggressive lobby groups 
which has been instrumental in blocking US ratification of the protocol. Other 
                                                 
13 The term “radiative forcing” denotes an externally imposed perturbation in the radiative energy 
budget of the Earth’s climate system. (IPCC website (accessed on October 1/04): 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/214.htm#611 
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aggressive opponents of the protocol include oil companies like Exxon, Mobil and 
Texaco. 
 
Nigeria 
As indicated by the EIA (August 2004), Nigeria is the seventh largest oil producer 
in the world, with proven reserves of between 25 billion (Oil & gas Journal) and 
32.5 billion barrels (OPEC), and the largest oil producer in Africa, south of the 
Sahara. The country’s main environmental challenges result from oil spills (EIA 
estimates about 4,000 oil spills in the Niger Delta since 1960) resulting in the loss 
of mangrove trees; air pollution from gas flaring; deforestation; and a general 
dearth of  environmental regulations. Although improvements are being 
introduced, marine pollution and air pollution from gas flaring still constitute a 
serious problem. Exhaust emissions from the high rate of private car use, and from 
diesel and petrol powered private electricity generators, continue to leave Lagos, 
the commercial capital, shrouded in smog. This risk is exacerbated by the 
country’s continued dependence on unleaded fuel. 
 
Human Health 
A significant outcome of the environmental risks perpetrated by the oil industry is 
its impact on human health. This is exemplified by the results of an experiment 
carried out by Asonye and Bello (2004) on children in the oil producing part of 
Delta State in Nigeria. They discovered that the accumulation of diverse 
categories of pollutants from drilling, production, and refining of crude oil, and 
from the production of petrochemicals especially black carbon, made the children 
more susceptible to pollution keratoconjunctivitis (PKC)14. 
 
Canada 
Canada has the largest proved oil reserves in the western hemisphere (EIA, 
January 2004). It is a net exporter of energy (mainly to the US); in 2001, it was 
ranked fifth largest oil producing country in the world, behind United States, 
Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia.  Canada's heavy reliance on energy-intensive 
industries has led to serious environmental concerns, primarily regarding air 
                                                 
14 An eye infection with the following clinical symptoms: persistent itching, foreign body 
sensation, specified limbal  / conjunctival discolouration, 
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pollution and climate change. In 2000, The NAFTA15 Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation reports that the province of Ontario was the third-
worst polluting state or province in both Canada and the United States. The report 
claims that Canadian toxic air emissions from plants and mills increased by 7% 
from 1998 to 2000 while those in the United States fell by 8% over the same 
period. According to Environment Canada (EC) while air quality in Canada has 
improved in some parts, there was a general lack of improvement in emissions of 
volatile organic compounds. EC blames automobile emissions for the highest 
contribution to air pollution, saying that the transportation sector contributed 40% 
of the nitrogen oxide and 25% of the carbon dioxide emitted into Canada’s 
atmosphere; the result of a rise, between 1990 and 2000, of 9% in automobile 
travel and 21% in fossil fuel consumption. In 2001, the country was one of the 
world's leading carbon emitting countries, generating 156.2 mmt16 of energy 
related carbon emissions (2.5% of the world total, EIA, January 2004). One of the 
major environmental effects of air pollution is acid rain and in Canada, this 
severely affects lakes, damages forests, and negatively impacts agricultural and 
forest productivity.  
 
Acid Rain 
The exhaust fumes released by petrol and diesel powered vehicles and industrial 
plants contain carbon monoxide, sulphur, and nitrogen oxides which react with 
water in the air to form strong acids like sulphuric and nitric acids (OECD, 2001). 
These acids are then deposited back to earth in the form of rain, fog, and snow 
(wet deposits) or as acidic gases and particles (dry deposits), raising the level of 
acidity in rivers, and lakes; endangering fish and plants, and historic buildings and  
monuments. Although a fringe school of thought suggests that acid rain may 
actually help to reduce the incidence of global warming, it is still generally 
regarded as an environmental risk that should be minimised. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreements (signatories are US, Canada, and Mexico) 
16 million metric tons 
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Paradox 
Though the foregoing depicts the oil industry negatively, its existence is actually 
of immense benefit to society and technological development. The BP 
Sustainability Report, 2003, succinctly summarises the paradox of the industry’s 
existence thus, “…energy that provides society with heat, light and mobility, 
fuelling economic growth and development, simultaneously presents us with 
serious environmental and social challenges”.  
 
The western world has depended on oil since the industrial revolution and the 
global economy will continue to run on it for the foreseeable future. It is true that 
there are environmental hazards associated with the industry but the high standard 
of living enjoyed in most parts of the world would be impossible without oil and 
gas. Nor would it be possible to enjoy the advantages of the numerous beneficial 
goods made from petroleum products such as plastics, medicines, clothing, and 
cosmetics.  
 
Quoting the World Energy Assessment, the BP report recognises that energy is 
central to achieving the inter-related economic, social, and environmental aims of 
sustainable human development. For it to fulfil this role however, it must address 
the consequences of its production and consumption. This statement may be 
interpreted as awareness, on the part of BP and possibly the industry, of 
stakeholder concerns about environmental sustainability and the industry’s 
willingness to deal appropriately with these concerns. This statement seems like 
an endorsement of stakeholder and legitimacy theories. 
 
Commentary 
As discussed above, repairing or maintaining legitimacy involves effective 
communication of corporate information to stakeholders. Such information must 
show that the company is in compliance with societal norms, and it may be 
disseminated via several media, including annual reports, statutory filings, web 
site postings, advertisements, and event sponsorship. Juggling between satisfying 
societal needs and its environmental sustainability demands on the one hand, 
versus the industry’s profit motives on the other, oil industry management likely 
see CSR disclosures as a cost-effective means of influencing the public policy 
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process (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001). There is established support for the argument that 
higher environmental risk gives rise to greater likelihood of negative societal 
perception, which in turn increases the need for communication through corporate 
disclosures such as environmental CSR reports (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001). Therefore, 
given their reputation, oil companies will be expected to exhibit a high quality of 
environmental disclosure, relative to the other industries that society deems to be 
less environmentally risky. A high quality of disclosure suggests a superior level 
of transparency and accountability of disclosure. If this is in fact the case in the oil 
industry, it will serve to reinforce the relevance of the stakeholder and legitimacy 
theories to the industry.   
 
Summary 
Chapter three has attempted to connect the oil industry to environmental risks by 
exploring the reasons for the industry’s global negative perception; thus 
establishing a need for the industry to adopt legitimisation strategies such as 
voluntary corporate environmental disclosures. Accordingly, corporate 
environmental reports may be regarded as managements’ response to societal 
demands for improved corporate responsibility in the area of environmental 
sustainability. Despite the oil industry’s positive contributions to socie ty, these 
societal demands have arisen as a result of the observable and growing global 
awareness of the debilitating effects of the industry’s operations on the 
environment, and on human health. Linking the theories discussed in chapter two, 
the oil indus try’s reputation, and the global perceptions discussed above, the 
industry will be expected to display a high level of legitimacy; with the annual 
report serving as the medium for measuring both the quality of environmental 
reporting and indirectly, the level of its legitimacy. Against this background, 
chapter four will evaluate the quality of the individual environmental reports of 
the companies which are listed on Table 3.  
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Chapter 4  
METHODOLOGY 
 
Overview 
This chapter starts by justifying the use of annual reports. Then, it discusses the 
flexibility of GRI reporting standards and explains how this flexibility has been 
incorporated in an evaluation matrix for testing purposes. Next, it defines the 
selected corporate characteristics before considering the research paradigms and 
the choice of methodology, which are followed by a description of the sample 
selection criteria. The chapter then details the testing and scoring methods, 
including the statistical methods used in the empirical testing of the impact of 
selected corporate characteristics on the quality of the environmental reports.  
 
Annual Reports 
Representing an effective tool for managing external perceptions (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; and Lindblom, 1994), annual reports are considered to be the most 
popular medium for the dissemination of voluntary and statutory corporate 
information. In determining the medium of corporate communication to be 
reviewed in this dissertation, annual reports (defined here to include CSR 
environmental reports), were chosen because they are easily accessible. The 
company’s most current annual reports were chosen, corresponding to the first 
complete reporting period after the introduction of the GRI reporting standards in 
2002. In all but two 17 of the cases, this was the 2003 year end. In view of the 
increasing popularity of corporate websites as the preferred avenue for the 
dissemination of such information, the reports evaluated in this study were 
downloaded from the website of the respective companies. The websites of most 
of the sampled companies, like BP and Nexen Inc., contained both an annual 
report with in-depth financial information and an overview of environmental 
performance, and a separate CSR / stand alone environmental report containing 
detailed disclosure of environmental performance. Other companies, such as Pogo 
Producing Company and PetroKazakhstan, did not have a CSR / stand alone 
environmental report on their website, and failed to include any meaningful CSR 
                                                 
17 ChevronTexaco have issued a 2003 CSR update which had to be read in conjunction with the 
full CSR report issued in 2002; and Premier Oil’s most current report was for 2002. 
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environmental disclosure in their annual reports. At the other end of the scale, 
companies like Unocal and Murphy Oil provided in-depth disclosure of 
environmental performance in a separate, stand-alone CSR / environmental report, 
without any significant coverage of same in their annual report. 
 
Usefulness of the annual report 
The usefulness of the annual report as a medium for responding to public pressure 
and negative media reports has been acknowledged by writers such as Brown and 
Deegan (1999) and O’Donovan (1999). In particular, O’Donovan (1998) 
recognised its use as a way of correcting negative public perceptions about a 
company’s environmental activities. In addition to the mainly financial 
information, several companies now include CSR disclosures within their 
traditional annual report e.g. BP and Nexen Inc. (see above) while others, like 
Unocal and Murphy Oil produce a separate annual CSR report, in addition to the 
traditional report. However, though the annual report represents the ideal 
document for evaluating the quality of a company’s corporate disclosure, it is not 
without its limitations.  
 
Limitations of annual reports 
According to Wiseman (1982), corporate environmental disclosures constitute an 
incomplete reflection of a company’s actual environmental performance. 
Similarly, Unerman (2000) contended that the social information disclosed in the 
annual report represents an inconsistent proportion of total disclosure, constituting 
only a small proportion of a company’s total social reporting. Tilt (1994) takes the 
position that corporate environmental disclosure has little credibility and isn’t 
sufficient information to be relied on; while Deegan and Gordon (1996) and 
Deegan and Rankin (1996) believe that it may be used by management for self-
praise. Another shortcoming of using annual report disclosures concerns 
independent verification or corroboration of such information. Despite all the 
foregoing, the use of annual reports in evaluating corporate disclosure practices is 
well established. Wiseman (1982) advocated its use by stating that ‘it is widely 
recognised as the principal means of corporate communication and has been the 
source of virtually all previous corporate research’. Besides, third party 
certification does not add much value or credibility unless there is an agreed upon 
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standard for reporting and the third party agency is trusted (MacLean, 1997). 
Generally, an annual report is a recognised means of corporate communication, 
and continues to be used for disseminating financial, social and environmental 
information (Deegan et al, 2000; Wilmshurst and Frost, 1998; O’Donovan, 2002). 
 
GRI flexibility 
Although it outlines the basic information for inclusion in a CSR report, the GRI 
standards allow for the ‘wide spectrum of reporter experience and capabilities’ by 
permitting reporting entities to ‘select an approach that is suitable to their 
individual organisations’. It encourages organisations to use the prescribed 
reporting format because ‘completeness and comparability in economic, 
environmental, and social reporting are best served when all reporting 
organisations adhere to a common structure’. However, the above is not a 
requirement since the standards also recognise that some reporting entities may 
choose a different structure because of their corporate characteristics. This 
recognition of corporate structural and operational divergence accords with the 
‘comply or explain’ requirement of the UK’s combined code and factored in the 
decision to consider the impact if any, of corporate characteristics on the quality 
of individual corporate environmental report. In addition, reporting organisations 
are encouraged to expand the reporting requirements by adding content that they 
have identified through stakeholder consultation. Despite such a flexible approach, 
there is enough specificity in the framework of the guidelines for it to promote 
global comparability and consistency of environmental reporting.  
 
‘In Accordance’ versus Incremental reporting  
Reporting organisations have the option of reporting ‘in accordance’ with the GRI 
guidelines. This option is designed for organisations ‘that are ready for a high 
level of reporting and who seek to distinguish themselves as leaders in the field’. 
‘In Accordance’ reporting is an attempt to balance comparability and flexibility, 
and it involves consistency with the principles set out in Part B (Reporting 
Principles), and compliance with the requirements of all the sections in Part C of 
the guidelines (Report Content), as well as inclusion of an ‘in accordance’ report 
signed by the CEO. At the opposite end, organisations with an immature reporting 
capacity may choose an informal reporting approach which involves an 
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incremental basis of reporting. Such companies are thereby permitted to ‘choose 
not to cover all of the contents of the guidelines in the ir initial efforts, but rather to 
base their reports on the GRI framework and to incrementally improve report 
content coverage, transparency, and structure over time’.   
 
Corporate characteristics 
To ascertain the impact of corporate characteristics on the quality of individual 
company environmental report, the following characteristics have been chosen: 
 industry membership (oil industry) 
 ownership structure (public companies) 
 economic performance (measured by the profitability metric of return on asset) 
 size (measured by gross operating revenue)  
 influence of local reporting requirements (measured by the identity of the audit 
firm) 
 influence of local culture and attitudes (measured by corporate jurisdiction) 
 governance structure (measured by the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board)  
 liquidity (measured by the quick ratio). 
 
Industry membership 
Adams et al (1998) found that ‘industry membership’ was a primary factor in 
reporting environmental information. Similarly, Deegan & Gordon (1996) found 
that firms disclose relatively more positive information as environmental exposure 
increases. Thus, by virtue of being in an industry with significant environmental 
impact, oil companies may regard greater environmental disclosure as a way of 
mitigating the effect of their potentially risky activities on the environment and 
society (Hackston & Milne, 1996). The oil industry was selected as the sole 
industry of focus for this dissertation because its singular dominance of global 
environmental activities makes research into the industry more topical and of 
greater relevance to concerned global stakeholders than research into less 
environmentally sensitive industries (Wiseman, 1982).  
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Ownership structure 
Compared with privately owned companies which tend to be owner-managed, the 
agency problem arising from the ownership structure of public companies 
imposes on its management a greater pressure for transparency and accountability. 
As a result, public companies have a higher threshold of disclosure. The more 
diverse the shareholding, the greater the onus on management to communicate 
their stewardship via media such as corporate reports; and the higher the expected 
quality of the report. Consequently, this dissertation focuses on multi-national 
companies with listings on the London and / or New York Stock exchanges. 
 
Since all the sampled companies belong to the same industry and since they are 
regarded as having the same ownership structure (multinational publicly traded 
companies) these two characteristics have not been included as variables in the 
regression analysis below. 
 
Economic performance 
Ullman (1985) found that voluntary CSR disclosure is a function of corporate 
performance – the poorer the company’s economic performance, the lower is its 
voluntary disclosure. Citing Zmijewski and Hagerman’s (1981) argument that a 
higher net income increases a company’s visibility, Cowen et al (1987) indicate 
that profitability is a factor that induces management to undertake more extensive 
CSR disclosure. In this dissertation, economic performance is measured by 
profitability, as represented by return on assets. 
 
Size 
Most studies of social disclosure have identified size as a significant characteristic 
in explaining corporate CSR disclosure (Preston, 1978; Trotman and Bradley, 
1981; Cowen et al, 1987). Linking size to ownership status, Cormier and Gordon 
(2001) showed that larger companies provided more social and environmental 
information than smaller ones. As globalisation is synonymous with large multi-
national companies having a diverse shareholder base, it may be regarded as an 
attribute of corporate size. Citing the work of previous researchers, Campbell et al 
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(2003) justified the selection of large companies18 on the grounds that their study 
would be more meaningful due to the existence of size effects in social reporting, 
causing trends and switch points to be more pronounced than they would be in 
smaller companies. Spicer (1978) found that larger companies19 provide better 
environmental reports than smaller ones; so did Trotman and Bradley (1981) 
whose findings suggest that larger sized firms19 not only provide more 
environmental disclosure, but have a positive systemic risk and a longer-term 
planning horizon. In this dissertation, size is measured by the company’s gross 
operating revenue, denoted in US dollars. 
 
Local culture, attitudes and reporting requirements 
Adams et al (1998) also found that the level and nature of disclosure are 
influenced by a company’s corporate jurisdiction of domicile. This influence may 
be attributable to local custom and attitude towards environmental sustainability 
issues, and to related auditing and accounting reporting requirements and laws. 
Reflecting the global trend, the oil companies included in this dissertation are 
domiciled either in North America (US or Canada) or in Europe. As the sampled 
companies were all audited by the ‘big four’, names of audit firms were selected 
as a corporate characteristic to further underscore the impact of local attitude, laws, 
and reporting requirements on the quality of environmental reporting. In instances 
where the audits are carried out jointly, only the name of the principal audit firm 
has been included in the empirical test.  
 
Governance Structure 
This is measured by the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board. This metric was chosen as a characteristic in order to test the effect, if any, 
of an independent board on corporate reporting. The expectation is that such 
independence will lend itself to a higher level of accountability in corporate 
reporting, in the form of increased transparency and greater objectivity.    
 
 
                                                 
18 Defined by market value as companies that had been continual members of the FTSE 100 from 
January 1974 to June 1998 
19 Defined in terms of financial performance and risk 
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Liquidity 
 This is a measure of a company's capacity to pay its debts as they come due. It is 
an important financial ratio of corporate credit worthiness and was chosen as a 
characteristic to test its impact, if any, on the quality of environmental reports. 
The metric used is the quick ratio. 
 
Research paradigms 
In relation to research, Hussey & Hussey (1997) use the term ‘paradigm’ 
interchangeably with the term ‘philosophy’, defining it as “...assumptions about 
how research should be conducted”.  They identified the two main paradigms as 
positivist (a quantitative and scientific philosophy which is founded on the belief 
that the study of human behaviour should be conducted in the same way as 
scientific study); and phenomenological (a qualitative and humanistic philosophy 
which is concerned with understanding human behaviour from the participant’s 
own frame of reference). To them, these philosophies represent, in practical terms, 
extremes of a continuum with many intermediate stages. Morgan and Smircich 
(1980) identify six such intermediate stages, including a ‘reality as a contextual 
field of information’ stage which allows for the application of both paradigms in 
conducting research. At the same time as it recognises the existence of objective 
reporting frameworks and assumptions in terms of the disclosures in corporate 
reports, it also accepts that corporate decisions are motivated by subjective and 
contextual considerations, permitting the collection of appropriate information to 
enable further investigation.   
 
Methodology 
This study uses a combination of both paradigms in accordance with Morgan and 
Smircich’s ‘reality as a contextual field of information’ stage. The GRI principles 
and the information contents of a CSR report comprise qualitative information 
based on the phenomenological philosophy; which is the more appropriate 
approach for evaluating the quality of environmental disclosures. However, to 
analyse, draw objective conclusions, and better understand the underlying causal 
relationships and factors that underpin the results obtained from a qualitative test, 
a positivistic or quantitative approach is more appropriate. This suggests that 
qualitative data should be converted into an objective and measurable frame of 
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reference using a quantitative framework, to facilitate a scientific interpretation of 
the results of the qualitative tests. The statistical methods used for the analysis 
part of this dissertation are a combination of descriptive statistics and linear 
regression, incorporating the use of dummy data for non-quantitative variables. 
Nevertheless, the ensuing discussions and explanations about the quality of the 
environmental reports, and about the impact of corporate characteristics, if any, 
will borrow from a phenomenological approach. 
 
Sample selection 
The oil companies sampled in this dissertation were taken from a population of 
multi-national, publicly traded oil companies only. Since, as previously stated in 
chapter two, publicly quoted companies are especially likely to resort to the use of 
legitimising strategies to protect their corporate existence, they would be more 
likely to respond to market forces and societal perceptions. Consequently, the 
adoption of voluntary corporate environmental disclosure as a legitimising 
strategy can be directly attributable to a company’s publicly traded status and the 
associated diverse ownership base; traits that oblige a company to establish and 
maintain reliable corporate governance structures in order to successfully 
persuade stakeholders that it is truly transparent and accountable. For these 
reasons, national oil companies which are government owned and lack 
shareholders, and other non-publicly traded oil companies were excluded from the 
population. The publicly quoted multinational oil companies that were included in 
this exercise had to satisfy the following criteria: 
 
 be listed on the Society of Petroleum Engineers’ (SPE) website as (a) an 
integrated global (major) oil company; (b) additional independent oil company 
outside the US; or (c) additional independent oil company within the US 
 be a multi-national oil company with global oil and gas operations 
 be listed on the London Stock Exchange and / or the New York Stock 
Exchange 
 
The thirty-four oil companies that met the above criteria are listed on Table 3 and 
their annual reports (defined to include all CSR environmental disclosure) were 
obtained by visiting the website of the respective companies. 
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Method of Analysis 
The method of analysis adopted in this dissertation acknowledges the above 
flexibility in the GRI approach to reporting. To allow for differences in reporting 
format and approach, and borrowing from the method embraced by Hussey et al 
(2001), the questions in Table 4 (the evaluation matrix) have been framed to 
encapsulate the substance of the GRI reporting requirements and not just its form. 
Consequently, in evaluating the disclosure content of the reports vis-à-vis the GRI 
requirements, more emphasis was placed on the substance of the reporting entity’s 
disclosure; with less emphasis being put on compliance with the form of the 
reporting requirements. In this regard, the review did not concentrate on the extent 
to which the reports reflected the wording or format of the GRI requirements. 
Rather, it sought to ascertain that the disclosure properly reflected the intended 
objectives of the reporting requirements; that they were meaningful and where 
necessary, properly quantified.  
 
Testing and scoring method 
The testing and scoring methods for evaluating the quality of individual company 
environmental reports are detailed below under the headings, environmental 
matrix and corporate characteristics. The overall quality of environmental 
reporting within the oil industry is judged on the following basis: it is considered 
to be high, if 50% (17) or more of the thirty-four companies in the sample achieve 
a minimum score of 65% on the matrix; an average level of reporting corresponds 
to 66% (23) or more companies achieving a minimum score of 45%; and a low 
level of reporting is assumed if 34% (11) or more companies achieve a score 
below 45%.  
 
Environmental matrix 
The reporting requirements of the guidelines have been summarised into the  
fifty-five questions defined on the matrix (Table 4). These questions encompass 
sections one to four of Part C of the GRI guidelines, as well as the environmental 
section of the performance indicators outlined in section five of the same part. The 
researcher has added the four additional questions, in sections five and six, to test 
how many of the companies followed the ‘in accordance’ reporting requirements; 
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how many chose an informal approach to reporting; and how many made no 
reference to the GRI guidelines at all.  
 
Companies were scored on the basis of compliance or otherwise with the GRI 
requirements. Compliance is indicated by a score of 1 while non-compliance 
attracts a score of 0. A company’s performance is evaluated on the basis of the 
total scores achieved out of fifty-five. These values represent the dependent 
variable in the empirical regression model in the following section. Ttotals are 
also provided for each of the main reporting subheadings to enable a more 
detailed investigation and analysis of the results obtained. The qualitative 
evaluation of the results is based on the outcome of descriptive statistical analysis 
and on the use of graphs which were drawn by using an excel spreadsheet.  
 
Corporate characteristics 
The data on which the corporate characteristics metrics are based were obtained 
from the annual reports (as defined on page 42) posted on the websites of the 
sampled companies, and from the financial database of Thomson Analytics, a 
leading financial database. Using SSPS for windows, linear regression was used 
for the empirical testing of the impact of the corporate characteristics (the 
independent variables) on the quality of environmental reports, to provide a 
scientific basis for the analysis and the conclusions reached. Non-numeric 
characteristics have been redefined using dummy data as follows: 
 
Audit firm:  
The characteristic, local reporting requirements, uses the identity of the audit firm 
as a metric, and seeks to measure the influence of local reporting requirements on 
the quality of reporting where a different national office of the same global 
accounting partnership audits different companies. For example, Amerada Hess 
Corp. is audited by Ernst & Young (US) while BP is audited by Ernst & Young, 
UK. Both audit firms belong to the same global partnership network but each has 
to comply with the auditing and reporting regulations of the country in which it 
practices, and it is the impact of this characteristic on the quality of reporting that 
is being measured. Accordingly, the audit firms have been ascribed the following 
dummy data: 
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Ernst & Young = 1;  PwC = 2;  KPMG = 3;  Deloitte & Touche = 4; 
and the different countries have been quantitatively redefined as follows: US = 0; 
UK = 1; Italy = 2; Canada = 3; France = 4; Russia = 5; Norway = 6; Spain = 7. 
Thus, looking at Ernst & Young, the Canada office is denoted by 13 whilst the 
Norwegian office becomes 16. PwC in Russia is shown as 25 and KPMG France 
is 34. 
 
Corporate jurisdiction 
Since the corporate jurisdiction of the sampled companies is either in North 
America or in Europe, only these two jurisdictions are recognised. North America 
has been redefined as 1 and Europe as 2. 
 
The linear regression model 
The empirical model for the linear regression is of the form: 
Qenv = Ep + Sz + Lr + Ca + Gs + Li 
where: Qenv = quality of environmental reporting (measured by GRI scores 
achieved on the evaluation matrix) 
Ep = Economic performance (measured by profitability metric of 
return on assets) 
  Sz = Size (measured by gross operating revenue) 
  Lr = Local reporting requirements (measured by audit firm name) 
  Ca = Local culture and attitudes (measured by corporate jurisdiction)
  Gs = Governance structure (measured by proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board) 
Li = Liquidity (measured by quick ratio) 
Generally, the term statistics refers to the means by which data are analysed, 
interpreted, and used for making decisions. Descriptive statistics, such as mean, 
median, mode and standard deviation, are a form of statistics that describe patterns 
and general trends in a data set by examining one variable at a time. To explore the 
possible existence of a causal relationship between two variables, linear regression 
techniques are generally used. This technique involves identifying a dependent 
variable (this is represented by Qenv in the above equation) and an independent 
variable (represented by the corporate characteristics identified above). However, 
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the result of a statistical analysis, and the conclusions drawn therefrom, are only as 
reliable as the data on which they are based. 
 
This chapter informed the debate, firstly by defending the use of annual reports and 
by defining the GRI reporting contents as well as the selected corporate 
characteristics. Second ly, it outlined the main research methodologies and justified 
the choice of methodology for this dissertation. Thirdly, it reviewed the sample 
selection basis before specifying the testing and scoring method. Fourthly, it lists the 
variables and describes the regression model used for the statistical analysis. The 
results obtained from evaluating a company’s environmental report are summarised 
on Table 5 (for details please refer to Table 4 – environmental matrix). These 
results, together with those from the statistical analyses are analysed and discussed 
in chapter five. 
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Chapter 5 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Overview  
From the summary of the GRI scores on Table 5, we can conclude that the level 
of compliance with the GRI environmental reporting requirements is low and not 
reflective of the industry’s high level of environmental impact. Except in a few 
instances, the disclosures lacked sufficient depth to reflect proper accountability, 
particularly in relation to the quantification of green house gas emissions. 
Although the vast majority of companies disclosed their environmental policies, 
which do not constitute a measure of environmental performance or activity, 
topics relating to actual environmental performance were poorly disclosed. 
Disclosure relating to water use and pollution, waste, energy use, and supply chain 
were sporadic, with information on waste materials from external sources, 
description of non-water use, the use and emission of ozone depleting substances, 
and energy sources for production and delivery to externals being quite scant.  
 
Analysis of GRI scores  
Of the thirty-four multinational oil companies sampled (Table 5), only 26% i.e. 
nine companies achieved a score of 65% or higher; 21%, representing seven 
companies, achieved a score of more than 45% but less than 65%; and 53%, equal 
to eighteen companies, scored less than 45% (Figure1). To the extent that more 
than half of the sampled companies scored less than 45%, one can safely infer that 
the quality of environmental reporting is poor.  
Figure -1   
 
Analysis of GRI scores
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Statistically, Figure 2 tells us that the mean score of 23.38 is higher than the 
median score of 22, and the mode score of 11 is exactly half of the median score. 
The mean measures the average value, the median is the middle value in order of 
size, and the mode is the most popular value. Generally, the closer these values 
are to each other, the more representative of the sample the mean is considered to 
be. The standard deviation also measures the overall variation from the mean. The 
smaller it is, the more reliable the mean is. A standard deviation of 13.09 such as 
is reported in Figure 2 informs us there is a high chance that the mean does not 
represent a particular score. This is corroborated by a range value of 44, which 
shows the difference between the largest (49) and smallest (5) numbers. The 
foregoing supports the conclusion reached by examining Table 5. As a result of 
the wide dispersal of the scores, the mean is not a representative figure as over 
half of the sampled companies scored less than this value. Thus, the large 
dispersal of the scores from the mean reflects the wide divergence in the quality of 
the individual environmental reports of the sampled companies, lending weight to 
the conclusion that the overall qua lity of environmental reporting within the oil 
industry is poor. 
Figure 2 
Total scores: GRI 
Mean 23.38 
Median 22.00 
Mode 11.00 
Standard deviation 13.09 
Skewness 0.15 
Range 44.00 
Minimum 5.00 
Maximum 49.00 
 
Breaking this down by main reporting subheadings, we are able to identify the 
areas of reporting strength and weakness. From Figure 3 below, we notice that 
under vision and strategy, 76% (26 companies) of the companies scored 50% or 
higher, reflecting a high quality of reporting. More reports contained a statement 
on the company’s vision and strategy on contribution to sustainability than 
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included a CEO statement of commitment to it, raising questions about the level 
of true accountability of reporting. Unfortunately, the steps involved in verifying 
the accuracy of disclosure are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 is based on the scores for the second subheading, ‘profile’. It shows that 
71% (24 companies) scored 50% (1.5 scores) or higher. All companies gave 
detailed disclosure about their organisation and operations but some did not 
identify their stakeholders and several more failed to include a CSR report profile 
and scope. 
Figure 4 
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Subheading 3 is divided into governance structure and management systems 
(management), and stakeholder engagement. Under management, 79% scored 
50% and higher while 21% scored less than 50% (Figure 5). As its name suggests, 
most of the required disclosure in this section relates to corporate governance 
structures, concentrating on board and management composition and expertise; 
shareholder participation; and policies on environmental issues. The high quality 
of reporting under this head could be attributed to the experience of reporting 
companies in annually providing this information. 
Figure 5 
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Overall, the quality of environmental reporting under these three headings is quite 
high, with about three-quarters of the companies complying with more than 50% 
of the reporting requirements. As mentioned, a possible explanation is the fact that 
disclosure in this area comprises mainly corporate information that normally 
accompanies the financial statements and investment reports. It would thus be 
easy to obtain and disclose. Reporting under these three subheadings constitutes 
the areas of reporting strength, a conclusion that is substantiated by the statistical 
analysis in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 
Total scores: Subheadings 1 – 3a 
Mean 12.68 
Median 14.00 
Mode 15.00 
Standard deviation 4.39 
Skewness -0.33 
Range 14.00 
Minimum 5.00 
Maximum 19.00 
 
Figure 6 informs us that the mean for the first three subheadings of 12.68 is lower 
than the median score of 14 and the modal value of 15, which are almost the same 
figure. The distribution is negatively skewed at -0.33. The standard deviation of 
4.39 suggests a more clustered distribution of the scores, as evidenced by the 
range value of 14. The more narrow dispersal of scores in these sections suggests 
a more representative mean which implies a higher quality of scores and reporting. 
This conclusion supports the findings shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5 above.  
 
Unlike the previous three subheadings, the results for the subsequent four 
subheadings depict a low quality of reporting. In the ‘stakeholder engagement’ 
section, Figure 7 shows us that only thirteen companies (38%) scored 50% and 
higher, with the rest scoring less than 25%.  
Figure 7 
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Besides failing to identify their stakeholders, most of the companies did not 
disclose their approach to stakeholder consultation. 
 
Subheading four, environmental performance, requires disclosure of the impact of 
operational activities on the environment. Required detailed disclosure includes 
information about greenhouse gas emissions, amount of energy and water use, 
renewable energy initiatives, waste management policies, details of environmental 
expenditure and fines, and general contribution to sustainability. Surprisingly, 
only eleven companies (32%) scored over 50% in this section (see Figure 8) with 
Figure 8 
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the majority of companies (47%) scoring less than 25% of the section’s total 
achievable points. Since this dissertation excludes a multiyear comparison, it is 
not possible to comment on whether this result represents an improvement on the 
quality of previous years’ reporting. Bearing in mind the voluntary nature of CSR 
reporting and the flexibility afforded by the GRI standards, it is worth noting that 
only 53% of the sampled companies scored more than 25% in this section; an 
outcome that indicates much room for improvement and that might suggest the 
need for a less voluntary and flexible reporting guideline. 
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Subheading five has been included to establish the number of companies that 
prepared their reports ‘in accordance’ with the GRI standards. This is the full 
reporting, requiring more effort than an informal reporting approach. As Figure 9 
shows, only six companies, representing 18%, reported in accordance. Of this 
number, only BP fully complied with all the requirements; the other companies 
did not include an ‘in accordance’ statement signed by the CEO, again suggesting 
a questionable level of accountability and transparency. 
Figure 9 
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Subheading six is the converse of subheading five in that it seeks to establish the 
number of companies reporting after the informal fashion, and the number of 
those that were not influenced by the GRI guidelines at all. From Figure 10, we 
glean that only 26% (9 companies) scored higher than 50% in describing how 
their report was influenced by the GRI guidelines.  
Figure 10 
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Overall, the disclosure in the last two subheadings was the poorest. Most of the 
companies did not make any disclosure at all, scoring zero points (28 and 25 
companies respectively under subheadings five and six). Similar to Figure 1 above, 
the statistical results in Figure 11 disclose that the mean of 10.71 is higher than 
the median value of 9.50 and much higher than the modal value of 0, showing that 
there is a wide dispersal of scores and that the mean is not representative of the 
sample. The distribution is positively skewed at 0.44 and the very wide 
distribution of the scores is represented by a standard deviation of 9.25 and a 
range value of 32.  
Figure 11 
Total scores: Subheadings 3b - 6 
Mean 10.71 
Median 9.50 
Mode 0.00 
Standard deviation 9.25 
Skewness 0.44 
Range 32.00 
Minimum 0.00 
Maximum 32.00 
 
Though these four subheadings focus mainly on detailed disclosure of 
environmental activities and performance, the overall results indicate a poor 
quality of environmental reporting. In view of the increasing global stakeholder 
concerns about environmental sustainability issues and the oil industry’s central 
role in the debate, the results are contrary to what one might expect, based on the 
dictates of the systems or social oriented theories about the voluntary corporate 
disclosure phenomenon. Contrary to the above results, the theories insinuate that 
companies operating in such an environmentally sensitive industry would be 
expected to display legitimising tendencies in the form of substantive 
environmental reporting. However, further research, which is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, would need to be undertaken before a definite conclusion can be 
drawn in this regard. 
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Commentary 
There are several possible explanations for such poor quality of environmental 
reporting. It is likely that because of the relative newness of environmental 
reporting, companies do not yet have a proper system in place for collecting 
information and for reporting. They may not yet be familiar with what constitutes 
pertinent and appropriate information for this purpose. Also, the cost of 
complying could be cited as a factor, as can the voluntary nature of the whole 
environmental reporting process.  
 
From an economic perspective, the status of oil companies as an important global 
economic force, through fuelling modern development, may provide further 
explanation for the poor quality of reporting. By virtue of this position, the whole 
industry (and not just OPEC) may be regarded as a cartel which enjoys a position 
akin to a monopoly over global oil and gas resources and products. This dominant 
position minimises the need for the industry to adopt legitimising strategies 
similar to voluntary environmental disclosures. As stated, the American oil 
industry makes up more than half of the global industry and constitutes a very 
powerful US government lobby group; manipulating stakeholder perception by 
influencing environmental policy and standards at the highest level. A good 
example of this form of legitimacy in practice is the US’ individual refusal to 
ratify the Kyoto accord. However, if the evolution of the financial reporting 
process is anything to go by, it is likely that the quality of environmental reporting 
will improve over time, as awareness about its importance increases and perhaps 
also, with the help of formal relevant regulations.  
 
The next section will test for the impact of corporate characteristics on the quality 
of oil industry environmental reports.  
 
Analysis of impact of corporate characteristics  
Linear regression is used to predict the effect on one variable of a change in 
another variable. In this case, it is used to predict the effect of changes in each of 
the corporate characteristics, on the total GRI score of each of the sampled oil 
companies. The results of the analysis are shown on Table 7.  
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Figure 12 
Model Summary
.612a .375 .236 11.444
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
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Predictors: (Constant), Quick Ratio, corporate
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bn), NED/Total Directors, Profitability (RoA)
a. 
 
Figure 12 above (from Table 7) is a summary of the variables in the regression 
model set out at the end of chapter four. It shows the values for R and R2. R has a 
value of .612 representing the correlation between GRI scores and the corporate 
characteristics. R2, representing the coefficient of determination, signifies that the 
corporate characteristics account for only 37.5% of the variation in the GRI scores. 
This may be interpreted to mean that 37.5% of any change in the quality of 
environmental reporting may be attributed to the corporate characteristics in our 
model. Conversely, 62.5% of the variation in the quality of reporting is 
determined by other factors which cannot be identified from this model. 
Determining the nature of these other factors would require further research which 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Thus, these percentages imply that the 
relationship between the GRI scores and each corporate characteristic may not be 
a linear one (as hypothesised by the regression formula), or that there are other 
unidentified variables such that these selected corporate characteristics have a low 
impact on the quality of environmental reporting within the oil industry. 
Figure 13 
ANOVAb
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Dependent Variable: Total scoresb. 
 
‘ANOVA’ (the analysis of variance) figure above (also from Table 7) indicates 
how well the model is able to predict the outcome of the variables. The most 
important value is the F ratio which measures the extent to which the model has 
improved the prediction of the outcome compared to the level of inaccuracy of the 
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model. At 2.697, it is significant at 5% level of significance since, at 3.5%, the 
column labelled ‘sig.’ is less than five percent. This result indicates that there is 
less than a 5% chance that the F value will occur by chance alone. Since, in this 
case, the ratio is greater than one, the regression model represents a good model 
for predicting the overall impact of corporate characteristics in determining the 
quality of environmental reporting within the oil industry.  
Figure 14 
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Figure 14, labelled ‘Coefficients’ (from Table 7) represents the regression line 
and informs us about the t value (which is derived by dividing B by its standard 
error). The B coefficient for the constant represents the GRI score if the quality of 
reporting was zero while the coefficient for each of the corporate characteristics 
represents the predicted change in the GRI score for a unit change in each of the 
characteristics. If each company’s profitability (measured by return on assets, 
ROA) increased by one unit, the GRI score will be expected to fall by 17.2%. The 
t value of - .521 is not significant at a 5% level so profitability is not a required 
variable in the regression model. The same conclusion may be drawn about the 
usefulness of local reporting requirements (measured by the identity of audit firm); 
governance structure (measured by the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board); and liquidity (measured by the quick ratio) as reliable characteristics 
for predicting changes in the GRI score and as determinants of the quality of 
environmental reporting within the oil industry. Their beta values are close to zero 
and the significance levels of the ir t values are much higher than the 5% level 
required.  
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Conversely, size (represented by operating revenue) and local culture and attitudes 
(represented by corporate jurisdiction) characteristics may be accepted as useful 
models for predicting changes in the GRI score. The t value for operating revenue 
is 1.841 at a level of significance of .077 while the corresponding results for 
corporate jurisdiction are 2.229 and .034 telling us that at 10% and 5% levels of 
significance respectively, the models are acceptable in predicting changes in GRI 
score for a unit change in each characteristic. The overall conclusion from the 
above analysis is that only these two corporate characteristics i.e. size and 
corporate jurisdiction may be regarded as having an impact on the quality of 
environmental reporting within the oil industry. As detailed above, the other 
characteristics do not have any significant impact on the quality of reporting.  
 
Commentary 
Size and corporate jurisdiction are the two characteristics that appear to have a 
significant impact in determining the quality of environmental reporting within 
the oil industry. Of the nine companies that scored more than 65%, 6 of them have 
a European corporate jurisdiction. Of the remaining three companies with North 
American corporate jurisdiction, two of them are based in Canada and only one is 
based in the US.  The three companies that followed the ‘in accordance’ reporting 
option were BP, Total, and Shell, all European based companies, ranking 3rd, 4th, 
and 1st by operating revenue (measure of size) out of the thirty-four companies 
sampled. The 2nd, 5th, and 6th largest by revenue (size) were ExxonMobil, 
ChevronTexaco and ConocoPhillips. They scored respectively, 47%, 58%, and 
40%, corroborating the result from the regression analysis above that operating 
revenue as a size metric has an impact on the quality of the environmental report 
(i.e. ConocoPhillips was the only large company to produce a poor quality report 
by scoring 40%). Interestingly, the corporate jurisdiction of these three oil 
companies, along with that of the majority of oil companies that scored less than 
50 % is in the US. In fact, of the sixteen companies that scored in excess of 45%, 
only five have their jurisdiction in the US, three are based in Canada, and the rest 
are based in Europe (one each in Italy, Spain, Norway, France, UK/Netherlands 
and three are UK based). Of the eighteen companies that have their corporate 
jurisdiction in the US, 73% (equal to 13 companies) scored less than 45% out of 
which five companies scored less than 20%. Only one UK company, out of a total 
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of five, scored less than 45%; out of a total of six Canadian based companies, half 
of them scored less than 45% with the worst scoring 20% (see Tables 5 and 6). 
 
The above analysis implies that European companies have a higher quality of 
voluntary environmental reporting than their North American counterparts.  
On-going American cynicism about the link between the harmful effect of 
greenhouse gases and the negative impact of oil industry operations and products 
may provide a logical explanation for the difference between the quality of 
American reporting and Canadian reporting on the one hand, and between 
American and European reporting on the other. Also, to the extent that the 
companies with corporate jurisdiction in the US appear to only be listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange, their ownership base will be mainly American. As a 
result, any legitimising strategy employed by these companies will be tailored to 
suit that group of stakeholders (their relevant public). Therefore, given the local 
attitude towards environmental sustainability, qualitative reporting in this area 
would have little significance.  
 
Looking at the other characteristics, no particular pattern emerges confirming that 
they have no significant impact on the quality of a company’s environmental 
reporting. Economic performance does not appear to have any impact because 
thirteen of the twenty companies (65%) with the lowest GRI scores have the 
highest return on assets values and the three top GRI scoring companies are 
amongst the worst performing companies based on return on assets. There is no 
noticeable trend from looking at local reporting requirements (measured by audit 
firm; Table 7 and Figure 14) and no further comments are warranted. As no 
apparent trend can be deduced from a review of the remaining two characteristics 
(governance structure and liquidity) no further comments will be made.  
 
Summary 
The result s of the statistical analyses corroborate the conclusion drawn from the 
GRI matrix that the quality of environmental reporting within the oil sector is low. 
Also, the corporate characteristics that have an impact on the quality of individual 
oil company, and oil industry, reporting are size (profitability) and local customs 
and attitude (corporate jurisdiction).  
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Implications for corporate governance 
The quality of environmental CSR reports has several corporate governance 
implications for the oil industry, not least because of its critical role in the 
globalisation and environmental sustainability debate but more so because of its 
primary role in triggering the current wave of corporate scandals, and the recent 
significant restatement of reserves by Royal Dutch/Shell group. The collapse of 
Enron Corp., the largest global oil and gas company in 2002 set off a wave of 
corporate scandals that has been likened to ‘the business world’s financial 
equivalent of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill’ (Williams, 2002). Thus, issues of 
corporate governance and accountability are fast becoming the basis for corporate 
evaluation in the areas of environmental care, socio-political relations, financial 
and other non-financial areas outside the scope of normal corporate activities. 
Nowhere is the pressure greater than in the oil industry which is witnessing 
increased stakeholder scrutiny of its operations, reporting processes, and 
governance structures. 
 
The industry is witnessing an increase in regulations and reporting requirements. 
While some of the regulations are externally imposed, others are self imposed; all 
geared towards protecting investor and other stakeholder confidence by ensuring 
greater transparency and accountability on the part of oil companies. The Enron 
scandal, based on financial trickery involving the off- the-books deals that propped 
up Enron's reputation even while it foundered in debt, is a good example of the 
irregularities in corporate reporting that misled investors; helping to reinforce  the 
importance of accountability and transparency in corporate reporting as standards 
of good governance. For oil companies, this issue has been exacerbated by the 
aforementioned reserve restatement by Shell. As this area of reporting is an 
important aspect of the oil company reporting process, the industry is now subject 
to greater scrutiny in this area of disclosure.  
 
The issue of auditor independence and the reliability of the audit process are 
closely linked to the above. Regulators have already responded with a wave of 
new governance standards including the establishment of an audit committee, the 
majority of whose members have to be independent non-executive directors (UK 
combined code). In the US, the principal executive and financial officers of a 
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public company must each certify the financial and other information in the 
annual report. Thus, poor quality of voluntary environmental reporting may 
further undermine the industry’s already tenuous position in this regard leading to 
stricter legislation and external regulation, in addition to undermining investor 
confidence in corporate reports. 
 
This concern is echoed in the new book, “Building Public Trust: The Future of 
Corporate Reporting” by Sam DiPiazza Jr. and Robert G. Eccles. They put 
forward a new model of corporate transparency involving a set of global generally 
accepted accounting principles; home-grown, consistently applied industry 
specific standards for measuring and reporting performance; and company 
specific information. In order to restore stakeholder confidence in companies, they 
propose the incorporation of three concepts to the corporate reporting supply 
chain. These are: 
 Spirit of transparency – involves a shift of focus from managing earnings and 
Wall Street’s expectations to objective reporting on the business’ main value 
drivers 
 Culture of accountability – everyone connected with the corporate reporting 
supply chain is personally accountable for his or her actions and duties 
 People of integrity – Corporate transparency and accountability can only be 
achieved through a personal commitment to integrity  
These suggestions are a combination of external and self regulatory initiatives 
which will require a fundamental shift in the current corporate management and 
reporting culture. In the short term, implementing the proposals will involve 
investment outlays and this will add to the already soaring costs of doing business. 
Therefore, the issue of increased costs is another implication arising from poor 
quality of reporting. This issue is significant when poor quality of environmental 
reporting becomes synonymous with a lack of due diligence in terms of a 
company’s environmental risk exposure; a point that is being championed by the 
Association of British Insurers who now require a disclosure of CSR risk exposure 
before granting insurance to companies. 
 
From within the US oil industry, the Enron disaster has led to calls for more 
stringent governmental regulations as evidenced by The Coalition for Energy 
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Market Integrity & Transparency’s (EMIT) call for a full investigation into likely 
natural gas and electricity price manipulation abuses by marketer-speculators. 
This call was due to information obtained about Enron’s activities. As already 
indicated, the gross lack of transparency and accountability in Enron’s reporting 
practices were largely responsible for its successful multi-year deception of 
stakeholders. This failing, together with Shell’s material reserve restatement and 
the industry’s lack of credibility in environmental matters underscore the growing 
interest and importance being placed on the quality of the oil industry’s annual 
environmental CSR reports, and on its corporate governance structures, as means 
of restoring stakeholders’ confidence.    
 
Poor corporate reporting also has implications for the market value of oil 
companies. According to Pamela Cohen Kalafut, a leading corporate valuation 
expert, more than half of a company’s value derives from intangible elements 
such as brand equity and strategy execution. For stakeholders to understand a 
company’s strategy and the metrics by which management measures the strategy’s 
success, they must be conveyed through effective channels of communication 
such as annual reports. A lack of stakeholder empathy for its corporate strategy 
will not bode well for a company as it might lead to a possible lack of confidence 
in its governance structures, and act as a disincentive to potential investors; with   
adverse effect on the company’s market value. 
 
However, not all oil companies subscribe to the view that they have a social 
responsibility or commitment. In a talk on May 7, 2002, Rene Dahan, 
ExxonMobil’s executive vice-president said, “a fundamental role of business is to 
help create prosperity……….business enterprises are at base neither philanthropic 
nor peacekeeping organisations”.  These views are shared by Olav Fjell, President 
and CEO, Statoil ASA, and by ChevronTexaco chairman and CEO, Dave J. 
O’Reilly. However, O’Reilly conceded that oil companies have a crucial role in 
raising difficult issues such as good governance to transparency to equitable 
sharing of revenues with their partners. He described these issues as those ‘which 
the world community is demanding action be taken by both governments and 
business’. Any action taken in this regard will need to be made known to the 
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world community and the effectiveness of such communication will be largely 
dependent on the quality of corporate reporting. 
 
Social responsibility, including environmental sustainability issues, is becoming a 
cornerstone of the oil industry’s evolving new paradigm on corporate governance 
and accountability. This has been linked to the growing stakeholder activist 
movements who are using their influence, as investors, customers, employees and 
suppliers to affect board behaviour by creating corporate governance standards of 
excellence, filing shareholder resolutions, and organising a boycott of a 
company’s products. Companies which have responded to these groups are 
regarded as demonstrating accountability and are rewarded by being included in 
the growing number of mutual funds or stock indices of companies with good 
CSR record. Reacting to these movements involves the adoption of legitimising 
strategies which must be effectively communicated, possibly through clear and 
transparent annual report disclosures. Conversely, perceived risk on CSR issues 
can lead to investor flight and difficulty in obtaining credit, a situation of 
particular concern to oil companies given the increasing competition for capital in 
the industry.  
 
Summary 
From the above, it is clear that the quality of the industry’s environmental 
reporting has considerable implications for its corporate governance. The oil 
industry is looked upon as an industry that is striving to live up to society’s 
expectations in the area of environmental sustainability. It may thus be classified 
as an industry in need of legitimising in order to protect its brand name and secure 
its long term viability. To successfully do this, its means of communication must 
be effective. As voluntary corporate disclosures in annual reports are 
acknowledged to be the most common form of corporate communication, these 
reports must be of a high quality if they are to be effective in enabling oil 
companies to benefit from the advantages that proper corporate accountability and 
transparency entail.  
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Using the GRI reporting requirements as a benchmark, this dissertation set out to 
evaluate the quality of environmental CSR reporting within the oil industry. A 
secondary aim was to determine the impact, if any, of selected corporate 
characteristics on the quality of environmental disclosure in that industry. To 
achieve these objectives, it was necessary to explore the theoretical rationale for 
voluntary corporate disclosure, and to also make the case for the oil industry’s 
unfavourable global stakeholder perception, so as to show how and why the 
disclosure theories affect the industry, and emphasise the importance, for the 
industry, to achieve a high quality of environmental reporting.   
 
The stakeholder and legitimacy theories are the more popularly cited basis for 
rationalising the voluntary corporate disclosure phenomenon. They contend that 
companies respond to external stimuli in the form of stakeholders and relevant 
publics. Communication forms a crucial aspect of this response and it generally 
takes the form of annual reports and other types of voluntary corporate disclosure. 
The need for legitimisation through effective communication by oil companies is 
underlined by the industry’s negative reputation in terms of environmental 
sustainability and human health; and in terms of its perceived lack of transparency 
and stakeholder accountability. Thus, environmental reports are a critical part of 
the oil industry’s attempts to restore and enhance stakeholder and investor 
confidence. Based on these theories, the higher the quality of reporting, the more 
successful the industry’s legitimising strategy is presumed to be and the higher its 
stakeholder influence. Such influence may manifest itself in the form of increased 
market value and share price, as well as in the industry’s position as a preferred 
employer of choice.   
 
Based on a mixture of the positivistic and phenomeno logical methodologies and 
on statistical analyses, the quality of the environmental reports of thirty-four oil 
companies was evaluated. This evaluation was followed by an investigation of the 
impact of selected corporate characteristics on the quality of the reports. Overall, 
the quality of reporting was found to be low with well over half of the sampled 
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companies scoring below 45% on the GRI evaluation test (Tables 4 and 5). 
Disclosure was particularly poor in the areas of environmental performance and 
impact of corporate sustainability activities. Of the six selected corporate 
characteristics, only two were found to have an impact on the quality of the 
environmental reports. Among the reasons put forward to explain these poor 
results are the newness of CSR environmental reporting; the flexible and 
voluntary nature of the GRI reporting requirements; and the cynicism of the US 
about the causes of the problems relating to environmental sustainability. Further 
discussion of the above results together with suggested reasons have been 
included in chapter five. That chapter concluded with a discussion of the corporate 
governance implications, for the oil industry, of the quality of its CSR 
environmental report. 
 
Although the results obtained from the above tests suggest a poor quality of 
environmental reporting within the oil sector, further tests are required before a 
definitive conclusion can be reached. This dissertation did not consider the 
veracity of the disclosure. Nor did it ascertain the completeness of the reports 
vis-à-vis a company’s environmental performance and activities. Also, the 
dissertation evaluated the reports for one year only. Only by undertaking a  
multi-year evaluation can a reliable trend be established; and only then can a 
definitive statement be made about the quality of oil industry’s environmental 
reporting.      
 
Recommendations  
Finally, to improve the level of reporting, the GRI guidelines may have to be more 
closely linked to corporate financial performance. The advantages of corporate 
compliance must be clearly demonstrated by stressing the link between 
compliance and sustained market value, increase in market share, and any 
improvement in performance as a result of unabated stakeholder approval and 
patronage.  
 
A further recommendation relates to the currently flexible nature of the GRI 
requirements. They may have to be less flexible than they currently are, and may 
need to be supported by regulations and laws for them to become established and 
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accepted. More definite guidance should be provided on relevant key performance 
indicators so as to help companies in gathering the appropriate information as 
cost-efficiently as possible; a step that should help to make compliance less costly 
and more attractive.  
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TABLE 1 - World proven crude oil reserves by country, 1999–2003 
 
http://www.opec.org/Publications/AB/pdf/AB002003.pdf 
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TABLE 2 - Major Oil Spills 
2002 November Spain Prestige carrying 20 million gallons (70,000 metric tons) of fuel oil broke up off the Spanish coast. 
2001 January Ecuador Ecuadorean-registered ship Jessica, spilled 175,000 gallons of diesel and bunker oil into the sea off the Galapagos Islands. 
2000 June South Africa Some 1,400 tonnes of heavy fuel oil leaked from the bulk carrier Treasure off Cape Town, affecting penguins on Dassen and 
Robben Islands. 
2000 January Brazil A ruptured pipeline spewed about 340,000 gallons of heavy oil into Guanabara Bay, Rio de Janeiro.  
1999 December France The stern of the Maltese tanker Erika sank off the northwest of Brittany after splitting in two, spilling 25,000 tonnes of viscous fuel 
oil. 
1997 December Sea of Japan Japan Russian tanker Nakhodka spilled 19,000 tonnes of oil after breaking in two in the Sea of Japan.  
1996 February  UK UK Liberian-registered Sea Empress hit rocks near Milford Haven, Wales, spilling 72,000 tonnes of oil. 
1994 October  Portugal Portugal Panamanian tanker, Cercal, spilled about 2,000 tonnes of crude into the sea after striking a rock near Leixoes harbour, in 
Oporto. 
1994 March  United Arab 
Emirates 
UAE 15,900 tonnes of crude oil leaked into the Arabian Sea after the Panamanian-flagged Seki collided with the UAE tanker 
Baynunah 10 miles off the UAE port of Fujairah. 
1994 March  Thailand About 105,000 gallons of diesel fuel spilled into the sea four miles off the eastern Sriracha coast after oil tanker Visahakit 5 and a 
cargo ship collided. 
1993 January  UK The tanker Braer hit rocks near the coast of the Shetland Islands and spilled its cargo of 85,000 tonnes of crude oil. 
1992 December  Spain Greek tanker Aegean Sea ran aground and broke in two near La Coruna spilling most of its 80,000 tonne cargo of oil. 
1992 September  Indonesia Liberian-registered tanker Nagasaki Spirit collided with container Ocean Blessing in the Malacca Straits, spilling some 12,000 
tonnes of crude. 
1991 May  Angola/Liberia A Liberian-registered supertanker, ABT Summer, leaked 260,000 tonnes of oil after an explosion off Angola causing an oil slick 17 
nautical miles by three. 
(compiled by George Draffan; website: http://www.endgame.org/oilspills.htm) 
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TABLE 2 - Major Oil Spills 
1991 April Italy The Haven spilled more than 50,000 tons of oil off Genoa in Italy. 
1991 January Persian Gulf Iraq released about 460 million gallons of crude oil into the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War. 
1990 February USA American Trader leaked 300,000 gallons of crude oil, polluting Bosa Chica, one of southern California's biggest nature preserves.  
1989 March USA Exxon Valdez grounded and spilled 10 million gallons (38,800 tons) of crude oil into Prince William Sound in Alaska.  
1989 December  Morrocco After explosions and a fire Iranian tanker Kharg-5 was abandoned spilling 70,000 tonnes of crude oil, endangering the coast and 
oyster beds at Oualidia. 
1983 August  South Africa Fire broke out on the Spanish tanker Castillo de Bellver and 175.6m gallons of light crude burnt off the coast at Cape Town. Fire 
broke out on the the Castillo de Bellver and its cargo of 252,000 tonnes of oil burnt. 
1979 July  Trinidad 160,000 tons of crude oil spilled after a collision off Tobago between the Atlantic Empress and the Aegean Captain. 
1978 March  France 220,000 tons of crude oil spilled after Amoco Cadiz ran aground near Portsall ; the slick eventually covered 125 miles of Breton 
coast. 
1977 February  Northern Pacific Liberian-registered Hawaiian Patriot caught fire in the Northern Pacific spilling 30.4m gallons.  
1976 December  USA Argo Merchant ran aground off Nantucket Island Massachusetts, spilling 7.7m gallons of oil and causing a slick 100 miles long and 
60 miles wide.  
1972 December  Oman After a collision with Brazilian tanker Horta Barbosa the South Korean tanker Sea Star spilled about 35.3m gallons of crude into the 
Gulf of Oman. 
1970 March  Sweden 15.3m gallons of oil spilled in a collision involving the Othello in Tralhavet Bay.  
1967 March UK The Torrey Canyon spilled 119,000 tons of crude off the Scilly Islands (Cornwall) in the UK. 
 
Sources:  http://www.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30200-1070965,00.html ; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2491317.stm    
   (compiled by George Draffan; website: http://www.endgame.org/oilspills.htm)
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TABLE 3 - List of sampled oil companies 
 
 
LSE NYSE 
Amerada Hess Corp. AHC
BP plc BP
ChevronTexaco Corp. ** CVX 2003 update report read together with full 2002 CSR report
ConocoPhillips Co. CoP
ENI SpA ENI S.p.A.
ExxonMobil Corp. XOM
Kerr-McGee Corp. KMG
Marathon Oil Corp. MRO
Murphy Oil Corp. MUR
Occidental Petroleum Corp. OXY
Petro-Canada PCZ
Shell (Royal Dutch / Shell group) SHEL LN  SC US / RD
Total TOT
Cairn Energy plc CNE
Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. CNQ
EnCana Corp. ECA
Lukoil Oil Co. LKOD
Nexen Inc. NXY
Norsk Hydro ASA NHY
PetroKazakhstan PKZ PKZ
Premier Oil plc ** PMO 2002 CSR is the latest available report
Repsol YPF REP
Talisman Energy Inc. TLM
Tullow Oil plc TLW
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. APC
Apache Corp. APA
Burlington Resources Inc. BR
Devon Energy Corp. DVN
EOG Resources Inc. EOG
Newfield Exploration Co. NFX
Pioneer Natural Resources Co. PXD
Pogo Producing Co. PPP
Unocal Corp. UCL
Vintage Petroleum Inc. VPI
Legend:
LSE - London Stock Exchange
NYSE - New York Stock Exchange
Additional Independent US Companies
Ticker symbolName of company
Integrated Global (Major) Companies
Additional non-US Companies
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TABLE 4 EVALUATION MATRIX (GRI SCORE MATRIX) 
Environmental Reporting Matrix
Questions based on GRI core indicators
All reports are for 2003, except ** for 2002 **
AHC BP CVX CoP ENI S.p.A. XOM KMG MRO MUR
1. Vision and Strategy:
1.1Statement of vision and strategy on contribution to sustainable development 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.2    CEO Statement of commitment to sustainability / report highlights 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
SUBTOTAL 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
2. Profile:
2.1     Organisational / Operational Structure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.3     Stakeholder identification / relationship 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
2.4    Scope / Profile of CSR report   1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
SUBTOTAL 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2
3. Governance Structure / Management Systems: 
3.1  Composition / expertise of Board and Major committees 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.2  Percentage of independent / unrelated non-executive board members  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.3    Identification / Management of programs / policies on environmental performance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
3.4  Linkages between executive pay and organisational performance 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
3.5  Organisational structure identifying key management personnel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.6  Mission and value statements, internal codes of conduct, environmental policies 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.7 Policies relating to measurement and improvement of management quality 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
3.8 Policies / processes for shareholder participation / involvement 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
3.9 Status of certification of environmental standards (e.g.independent reviewer; ISO 14001) 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
3.10 Explanation of policies on precautionary principle / risk mngt. approach 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
3.11 Environmental codes / voluntary initiatives endorsed by company 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
3.12 Principal industry / business association / advocacy group memberships 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
3.13 Supply Chain / Outsourcing policies 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
3.14 Approach to management of environmental impact of its activities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.15 Policies relating to decisions about location of operations 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
3.16 Policies relating to its environmental performance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SUBTOTAL 3a 11 12 11 10 11 11 11 6 10
Stakeholder Engagement:
3.17 Basis for selecting and identifying major stakeholders 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
3.18 Approaches to and frequency of stakeholder consultation 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3.19 Type of information generated by stakeholder consultation 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3.20 Use of stakeholder information 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 3b 4 4 0 1 4 0 0 1 0
4. Environmental Performance:
4.1  Describe total non-water materials use by type / definition of materials 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.2 Report % materials used that are waste from external sources (industrial / recycled items) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.3 Report on all energy sources for own operations (in joules) 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
4.4 Report energy sources used for production / delivery of energy products to externals 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
4.5  Initiatives promoting use of renewable energy / energy efficiency 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
4.6 Report indirect energy use e.g. travel, product lifecycle management 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.7Total water use including recycling and reuse of water 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
4.8 Water sources / ecosystems significantly affected by production processes 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.9 Annual withdrawals of ground and surface water 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
4.10 Report size / location land in bio-diversity rich habitat 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
4.11 Impact of production processes on bio-diversity / protected habitat 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
4.12 Policies on protecting / restoring degraded native eco-systems / species 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
4.13 Report Greenhouse gas emissions (in tonnes of CO 2 equivalent) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
4.14  Use, emissions of ozone-depleting substances in tonnes of CFC-11 equivalents 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.15 NO X, SOX, Methane and other significant air emissions by type 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
4.16 Details of hazardous materials / chemicals associated with company 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.17 Policy on waste management (recycling, recovery, landfilling) 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
4.18  Discharges to water by type (e.g oil seeps, spills) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.19 Details of water sources / ecosystems / habitat affected by discharges 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.20 Significant oil, chemical, fuel spills and impact on environment 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
4.21 Significant environmental impacts of main products and services 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
4.22 Percentage of product weight / volume reclaimable / reclaimed after use 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
4.23 Suppliers' compliance with Environment, Health, and Safety codes 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
4.24 Significant environmental impact of transportation employed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.25 Total environmental expenditure by type 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
4.26 Details of fines / non-compliance with environmental issues 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 4 15 24 16 6 7 11 2 4 7
5. 'In Accordance' reporting option:
5.1 Inclusion of a GRI contents index? 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.2 Report is consistent with GRI principles 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.3 Report includes 'in accordance' statement signed by CEO 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6. Incremental reporting option:
6.1  Description of how GRI guidelines informed report development 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL POINTS SCORED 36 49 32 22 26 26 16 14 21
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SCORED 65.45% 89.09% 58.18% 40.00% 47.27% 47.27% 29.09% 25.45% 38.18%
Company - Ticker Symbol
 
 77 
 
Environmental Reporting Matrix
Questions based on GRI core indicators
All reports are for 2003, except ** for 2002
OXY PCZ SHEL (LSE) TOT CNE CNQ ECA LKOD NXY
1. Vision and Strategy:
1.1Statement of vision and strategy on contribution to sustainable development 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1.2    CEO Statement of commitment to sustainability / report highlights 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
SUBTOTAL 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 2
2. Profile:
2.1     Organisational / Operational Structure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.3     Stakeholder identification / relationship 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
2.4    Scope / Profile of CSR report   1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
SUBTOTAL 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 3
3. Governance Structure / Management Systems: 
3.1  Composition / expertise of Board and Major committees 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.2  Percentage of independent / unrelated non-executive board members  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
3.3    Identification / Management of programs / policies on environmental performance 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
3.4  Linkages between executive pay and organisational performance 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5  Organisational structure identifying key management personnel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.6  Mission and value statements, internal codes of conduct, environmental policies 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.7 Policies relating to measurement and improvement of management quality 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.8 Policies / processes for shareholder participation / involvement 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
3.9 Status of certification of environmental standards (e.g.independent reviewer; ISO 14001) 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
3.10 Explanation of policies on precautionary principle / risk mngt. approach 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
3.11 Environmental codes / voluntary initiatives endorsed by company 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.12 Principal industry / business association / advocacy group memberships 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
3.13 Supply Chain / Outsourcing policies 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
3.14 Approach to management of environmental impact of its activities 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
3.15 Policies relating to decisions about location of operations 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
3.16 Policies relating to its environmental performance 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
SUBTOTAL 3a 14 11 14 13 12 9 9 10 10
Stakeholder Engagement:
3.17 Basis for selecting and identifying major stakeholders 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
3.18 Approaches to and frequency of stakeholder consultation 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
3.19 Type of information generated by stakeholder consultation 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
3.20 Use of stakeholder information 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
SUBTOTAL 3b 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 4
4. Environmental Performance:
4.1  Describe total non-water materials use by type / definition of materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.2 Report % materials used that are waste from external sources (industrial / recycled items) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.3 Report on all energy sources for own operations (in joules) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
4.4 Report energy sources used for production / delivery of energy products to externals 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
4.5  Initiatives promoting use of renewable energy / energy efficiency 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
4.6 Report indirect energy use e.g. travel, product lifecycle management 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.7Total water use including recycling and reuse of water 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
4.8 Water sources / ecosystems significantly affected by production processes 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
4.9 Annual withdrawals of ground and surface water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.10 Report size / location land in bio-diversity rich habitat 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
4.11 Impact of production processes on bio-diversity / protected habitat 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.12 Policies on protecting / restoring degraded native eco-systems / species 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4.13 Report Greenhouse gas emissions (in tonnes of CO 2 equivalent) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
4.14  Use, emissions of ozone-depleting substances in tonnes of CFC-11 equivalents 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.15 NO X, SOX, Methane and other significant air emissions by type 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
4.16 Details of hazardous materials / chemicals associated with company 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.17 Policy on waste management (recycling, recovery, landfilling) 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
4.18  Discharges to water by type (e.g oil seeps, spills) 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
4.19 Details of water sources / ecosystems / habitat affected by discharges 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
4.20 Significant oil, chemical, fuel spills and impact on environment 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
4.21 Significant environmental impacts of main products and services 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
4.22 Percentage of product weight / volume reclaimable / reclaimed after use 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
4.23 Suppliers' compliance with Environment, Health, and Safety codes 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
4.24 Significant environmental impact of transportation employed 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.25 Total environmental expenditure by type 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
4.26 Details of fines / non-compliance with environmental issues 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 4 14 17 16 20 16 5 6 8 12
5. 'In Accordance' reporting option:
5.1 Inclusion of a GRI contents index? 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
5.2 Report is consistent with GRI principles 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
5.3 Report includes 'in accordance' statement signed by CEO 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 5 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
6. Incremental reporting option:
6.1  Description of how GRI guidelines informed report development 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
SUBTOTAL 6 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
TOTAL POINTS SCORED 33 37 42 45 37 19 22 20 32
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SCORED 60.00% 67.27% 76.36% 81.82% 67.27% 34.55% 40.00% 36.36% 58.18%
Company - Ticker Symbol
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Environmental Reporting Matrix
Questions based on GRI core indicators
All reports are for 2003, except ** for 2002 **
NHY PKZ PMO REP TLM TLW APC APA BR
1. Vision and Strategy:
1.1Statement of vision and strategy on contribution to sustainable development 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
1.2    CEO Statement of commitment to sustainability / report highlights 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 1 1 0 2 2 2 0 1 0 1
2. Profile:
2.1     Organisational / Operational Structure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.3     Stakeholder identification / relationship 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
2.4    Scope / Profile of CSR report   0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 1
3. Governance Structure / Management Systems: 
3.1  Composition / expertise of Board and Major committees 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.2  Percentage of independent / unrelated non-executive board members  0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
3.3    Identification / Management of programs / policies on environmental performance 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
3.4  Linkages between executive pay and organisational performance 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
3.5  Organisational structure identifying key management personnel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.6  Mission and value statements, internal codes of conduct, environmental policies 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.7 Policies relating to measurement and improvement of management quality 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.8 Policies / processes for shareholder participation / involvement 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
3.9 Status of certification of environmental standards (e.g.independent reviewer; ISO 14001) 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
3.10 Explanation of policies on precautionary principle / risk mngt. approach 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
3.11 Environmental codes / voluntary initiatives endorsed by company 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
3.12 Principal industry / business association / advocacy group memberships 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.13 Supply Chain / Outsourcing policies 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
3.14 Approach to management of environmental impact of its activities 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
3.15 Policies relating to decisions about location of operations 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3.16 Policies relating to its environmental performance 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
SUBTOTAL 3a 8 8 14 10 12 5 8 7 8
Stakeholder Engagement:
3.17 Basis for selecting and identifying major stakeholders 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
3.18 Approaches to and frequency of stakeholder consultation 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
3.19 Type of information generated by stakeholder consultation 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
3.20 Use of stakeholder information 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 3b 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0
4. Environmental Performance:
4.1  Describe total non-water materials use by type / definition of materials 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.2 Report % materials used that are waste from external sources (industrial / recycled items) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.3 Report on all energy sources for own operations (in joules) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.4 Report energy sources used for production / delivery of energy products to externals 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.5  Initiatives promoting use of renewable energy / energy efficiency 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.6 Report indirect energy use e.g. travel, product lifecycle management 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.7Total water use including recycling and reuse of water 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.8 Water sources / ecosystems significantly affected by production processes 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.9 Annual withdrawals of ground and surface water 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.10 Report size / location land in bio-diversity rich habitat 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
4.11 Impact of production processes on bio-diversity / protected habitat 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
4.12 Policies on protecting / restoring degraded native eco-systems / species 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
4.13 Report Greenhouse gas emissions (in tonnes of CO 2 equivalent) 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.14  Use, emissions of ozone-depleting substances in tonnes of CFC-11 equivalents 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.15 NO X, SOX, Methane and other significant air emissions by type 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.16 Details of hazardous materials / chemicals associated with company 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.17 Policy on waste management (recycling, recovery, landfilling) 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.18  Discharges to water by type (e.g oil seeps, spills) 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.19 Details of water sources / ecosystems / habitat affected by discharges 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.20 Significant oil, chemical, fuel spills and impact on environment 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
4.21 Significant environmental impacts of main products and services 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
4.22 Percentage of product weight / volume reclaimable / reclaimed after use 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
4.23 Suppliers' compliance with Environment, Health, and Safety codes 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.24 Significant environmental impact of transportation employed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.25 Total environmental expenditure by type 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4.26 Details of fines / non-compliance with environmental issues 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 4 18 1 13 20 12 0 1 3 1
5. 'In Accordance' reporting option:
5.1 Inclusion of a GRI contents index? 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
5.2 Report is consistent with GRI principles 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
5.3 Report includes 'in accordance' statement signed by CEO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 5 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
6. Incremental reporting option:
6.1  Description of how GRI guidelines informed report development 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 6 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
TOTAL POINTS SCORED 29 11 39 38 36 6 11 11 11
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SCORED 52.73% 20.00% 70.91% 69.09% 65.45% 10.91% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Company - Ticker Symbol
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Environmental Reporting Matrix
Questions based on GRI core indicators
All reports are for 2003, except ** for 2002
DVN EOG NFX PXD PPP UCL VPI CONTROL
1. Vision and Strategy:
1.1Statement of vision and strategy on contribution to sustainable development 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1.2    CEO Statement of commitment to sustainability / report highlights 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SUBTOTAL 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 2
2. Profile:
2.1     Organisational / Operational Structure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.3     Stakeholder identification / relationship 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
2.4    Scope / Profile of CSR report   0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SUBTOTAL 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3
3. Governance Structure / Management Systems: 
3.1  Composition / expertise of Board and Major committees 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
3.2  Percentage of independent / unrelated non-executive board members  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
3.3    Identification / Management of programs / policies on environmental performance 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
3.4  Linkages between executive pay and organisational performance 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
3.5  Organisational structure identifying key management personnel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.6  Mission and value statements, internal codes of conduct, environmental policies 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
3.7 Policies relating to measurement and improvement of management quality 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
3.8 Policies / processes for shareholder participation / involvement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3.9 Status of certification of environmental standards (e.g.independent reviewer; ISO 14001) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3.10 Explanation of policies on precautionary principle / risk mngt. approach 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
3.11 Environmental codes / voluntary initiatives endorsed by company 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
3.12 Principal industry / business association / advocacy group memberships 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
3.13 Supply Chain / Outsourcing policies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3.14 Approach to management of environmental impact of its activities 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
3.15 Policies relating to decisions about location of operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3.16 Policies relating to its environmental performance 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
SUBTOTAL 3a 8 8 5 4 3 12 2 16
Stakeholder Engagement:
3.17 Basis for selecting and identifying major stakeholders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3.18 Approaches to and frequency of stakeholder consultation 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
3.19 Type of information generated by stakeholder consultation 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
3.20 Use of stakeholder information 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SUBTOTAL 3b 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 4
4. Environmental Performance:
4.1  Describe total non-water materials use by type / definition of materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.2 Report % materials used that are waste from external sources (industrial / recycled items) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.3 Report on all energy sources for own operations (in joules) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.4 Report energy sources used for production / delivery of energy products to externals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.5  Initiatives promoting use of renewable energy / energy efficiency 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.6 Report indirect energy use e.g. travel, product lifecycle management 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.7Total water use including recycling and reuse of water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.8 Water sources / ecosystems significantly affected by production processes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.9 Annual withdrawals of ground and surface water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.10 Report size / location land in bio-diversity rich habitat 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.11 Impact of production processes on bio-diversity / protected habitat 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.12 Policies on protecting / restoring degraded native eco-systems / species 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.13 Report Greenhouse gas emissions (in tonnes of CO2 equivalent) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.14  Use, emissions of ozone-depleting substances in tonnes of CFC-11 equivalents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.15 NOX, SOX, Methane and other significant air emissions by type 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.16 Details of hazardous materials / chemicals associated with company 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.17 Policy on waste management (recycling, recovery, landfilling) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.18  Discharges to water by type (e.g oil seeps, spills) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.19 Details of water sources / ecosystems / habitat affected by discharges 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.20 Significant oil, chemical, fuel spills and impact on environment 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.21 Significant environmental impacts of main products and services 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.22 Percentage of product weight / volume reclaimable / reclaimed after use 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.23 Suppliers' compliance with Environment, Health, and Safety codes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.24 Significant environmental impact of transportation employed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.25 Total environmental expenditure by type 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
4.26 Details of fines / non-compliance with environmental issues 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SUBTOTAL 4 4 0 0 0 0 10 0 26
5. 'In Accordance' reporting option:
5.1 Inclusion of a GRI contents index? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5.2 Report is consistent with GRI principles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5.3 Report includes 'in accordance' statement signed by CEO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SUBTOTAL 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
6. Incremental reporting option:
6.1  Description of how GRI guidelines informed report development 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SUBTOTAL 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
TOTAL POINTS SCORED 14 9 6 5 5 30 5 55
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SCORED 25.45% 16.36% 10.91% 9.09% 9.09% 54.55% 9.09% 100.00%
Company - Ticker Symbol
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TABLE 5 - SUMMARY OF GRI SCORES (FROM TABLE 4) 
 
 
Total %
Ticker Symbol Score
BP plc BP 49 89.09%
Total TOT 45 81.82%
Shell (Royal Dutch / Shell Group) SHEL (LSE) 42 76.36%
Premier Oil plc PMO 39 70.91%
Repsol YPF REP 38 69.09%
Petro-Canada PCZ 37 67.27%
Cairn Energy plc CNE 37 67.27%
Amerada Hess Corp. AHC 36 65.45%
Talisman Energy Inc. TLM 36 65.45%
Occidental Petroleum Corp. OXY 33 60.00%
ChevronTexaco Corp CVX 32 58.18%
Nexen Inc. NXY 32 58.18%
Unocal Corp. UCL 30 54.55%
Norsk Hydro ASA NHY 29 52.73%
ENI SpA ENI S.p.A. 26 47.27%
ExxonMobil Corp XOM 26 47.27%
ConocoPhillips CoP 22 40.00%
EnCana Corp ECA 22 40.00%
Murphy Oil Corp MUR 21 38.18%
Lukoil Oil Co LKOD 20 36.36%
Canadian Natural Resources Ltd CNQ 19 34.55%
Kerr-McGee Corp KMG 16 29.09%
Marathon Oil Corp MRO 14 25.45%
Devon Energy Corp DVN 14 25.45%
PetroKazakhstan PKZ 11 20.00%
Anadarko Petroleum Corp APC 11 20.00%
Apache Corp APA 11 20.00%
Burlington Resources Inc. BR 11 20.00%
EOG Resources Inc EOG 9 16.36%
Tullow oil plc TLW 6 10.91%
Newfield Exploration Co NFX 6 10.91%
Pioneer Natural Resources Co PXD 5 9.09%
Pogo Producing Co PPP 5 9.09%
Vintage Petroleum Inc VPI 5 9.09%
 
 
65% and 
higher 
>45% but < 
65%
< 45%
No. of Companies 9 7 18
% 26% 21% 53%
Analysis of scores
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TABLE 6 – CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS 
LSE symbol NYSE symbol Economic 
Performance 
Local Reporting 
requirements
##
Local culture and 
attitudes
##
Governance 
Structutre
Liquidity
 'GRI' 
score
Profitability 
(Return on 
Assets)
2003 Operating 
Revenue                 
(Local Currency)
2003 Operating 
Revenue                 
(US $ bn)
Audit firm aufit firm Corporate 
Jurisdiction
corporate 
jurisdiction
NED/Total Directors Quick Ratio
Amerada Hess Corp. AHC 6.31% US $ 14.311 14.31 Ernst & Young 10 US 1 66.67% 0.91 36
BP plc BP 6.61% US $ 232.571 232.57 Ernst & Young 11 UK 2 66.67% 0.59 49
ChevronTexaco Corp. CVX 10.03% US $ 120.032 120.03 PwC 20 US 1 85.71% 0.93 32
ConocoPhillips Co. CoP 6.89% US $ 104.196 104.20 Ernst & Young 10 US 1 87.50% 0.39 22
ENI SpA ENI S.p.A. 10.16% Euros 51.487 bn 64.65 PwC 22 Italy 2 87.50% 0.67 26
ExxonMobil Corp. XOM 14.18% US $ 237.054 237.05 PwC 20 US 1 72.73% 0.91 26
Kerr-McGee Corp. KMG 3.88% US $ 4.185 4.19 Ernst & Young 10 US 1 90.00% 0.55 16
Marathon Oil Corp. MRO 8.33% US $ 40.042 40.04 PwC 20 US 1 90.91% 0.93 14
Murphy Oil Corp. MUR 7.92% US $ 5.275 5.28 KPMG 30 US 1 90.91% 0.87 21
Occidental Petroleum Corp. OXY 10.31% US $ 9.326 9.33 KPMG 30 US 1 83.33% 0.73 33
Petro-Canada PCZ 13.15% Cdn $ 12.209 9.43 Deloitte & Touche 43 CANADA 1 83.33% 1.00 37
Shell (Royal Dutch / Shell group) SHEL LN  SC US / RD 8.61% US $ 268.892 268.89 PwC / KPMG 21 UK / NETHERLANDS 2 84.21% 0.46 42
Total TOT 8.87% Euros 104.652 bn 131.41
Ernst & Young / 
KPMG
14 FRANCE 2 94.12% 0.98 45
Cairn Energy plc CNE 9.96% £ 0.155814 bn 0.28 Ernst & Young 11 UK 2 54.55% 1.39 37
Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. CNQ 11.35% Cdn $ 5.972 4.61 PwC 23 CANADA 1 80.00% 0.63 19
EnCana Corp. ECA 11.33% Cdn $ 10.216 7.89 PwC 23 CANADA 1 87.50% 0.78 22
Lukoil Oil Co. LKOD 17.05% US $ 22.118 22.12 KPMG 35 RUSSIA 2 63.64% 1.04 20
Nexen Inc. NXY 11.25% Cdn $ 2.908 2.25 Deloitte & Touche 43 CANADA 1 90.91% 1.43 32
Norsk Hydro ASA NHY 6.05% NOK 171.782 bn 25.61 Deloitte & Touche 46 NORWAY 2 77.78% 0.88 29
PetroKazakhstan PKZ PKZ 44.74% US $ 1.117 1.12 Deloitte & Touche 43 CANADA 1 83.33% 1.99 11
Premier Oil plc PMO 6.59% £ 0.2577 bn 0.46 Ernst & Young 11 UK 2 60.00% 1.53 39
Repsol YPF REP 6.91% Euros 3.86 bn 4.85 Deloitte & Touche 47 SPAIN 2 64.29% 0.97 38
Talisman Energy Inc. TLM 9.40% Cdn $ 5.295 bn 4.09 Ernst & Young 13 CANADA 1 66.67% 0.70 36
Tullow Oil plc TLW 6.29% £ 0.132364 bn 0.24
Deloitte & Touche / 
Robert J. Kidney & 
Co.
41
UK 2 40.00% 1.51 6
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. APC 8.00% US $ 5.122 5.12 KPMG 30 US 1 80.00% 0.68 11
Apache Corp. APA 12.78% US $ 4.190299 4.19 Ernst & Young 10 US 1 84.62% 0.89 11
Burlington Resources Inc. BR 12.89% US $ 4.311 4.31 PwC 20 US 1 80.00% 1.53 11
Devon Energy Corp. DVN 12.82% US $ 7.352 7.35 KPMG 30 US 1 75.00% 1.10 14
EOG Resources Inc. EOG 12.29% US $ 1.537352 1.54 Deloitte & Touche 40 US 1 75.00% 0.65 9
Newfield Exploration Co. NFX 9.94% US $ 1.016986 1.02 PwC 20 US 1 72.73% 0.55 6
Pioneer Natural Resources Co. PXD 13.94% US $ 1.2986 1.30 Ernst & Young 10 US 1 91.67% 0.30 5
Pogo Producing Co. PPP 12.48% US $ 1.161996 1.16 PwC 20 US 1 85.71% 1.83 5
Unocal Corp. UCL 7.46% US $ 6.539 6.54 PwC 20 US 1 90.00% 0.81 30
Vintage Petroleum Inc. VPI -11.04% US $ 0.756327 0.76 Ernst & Young 10 US 1 62.50% 0.85 5
Sources: Colour code:
Information on Return on Assets and Quick Ratio obtained from Thomson Analytics database on November 23, 2004. website =  http://banker.analytics.thomsonib.com/ta/ companies scoring 75% and higher
Return on Assets is defined as (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Last Year’s Total Assets * 100 companies scoring > 50% but < 75%
Quick Ratio is defined as (Cash & Equivalents + Receivables (Net)) / Current Liabilities-Total 
companies scoring < 50% 
All other information obtained from company website
Legend: Corporate Jurisdiction: Audit firm: Country:
## = Dummy values: US and Canada are in North America = 1 Ernst & Young = 1 PwC = 2 US = 0 Italy = 2 Russia = 5 Spain = 7
All other jurisdictions are in Europe = 2 KPMG = 3 Deloitte & Touche = 4 UK = 1 Canada = 3 Norway = 6 France = 4
Additional Independent US Companies
Name of company
Integrated Global (Major) Companies
Additional non-US Companies
size 
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TABLE 7 – Regression Analysis 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb
Quick
Ratio,
corporate
jurisdictio
n, audit
firm, 2003
Revenue    
(US $ bn),
NED/Total
Directors,
Profitability
(RoA)
a
. Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: Total scoresb. 
 
Model Summary
.612a .375 .236 11.444
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Quick Ratio, corporate
jurisdiction, audit firm, 2003 Revenue                 (US $
bn), NED/Total Directors, Profitability (RoA)
a. 
 
ANOVAb
2119.759 6 353.293 2.697 .035a
3536.271 27 130.973
5656.029 33
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Quick Ratio, corporate jurisdiction, audit firm, 2003 Revenue
(US $ bn), NED/Total Directors, Profitability (RoA)
a. 
Dependent Variable: Total scoresb. 
 
Coefficientsa
-6.147 20.296 -.303 .764
-.172 .330 -.100 -.521 .607
.060 .033 .338 1.841 .077
.004 .187 .004 .020 .984
12.181 5.465 .430 2.229 .034
.155 .196 .149 .791 .436
1.047 6.368 .032 .164 .871
(Constant)
Profitability (RoA)
2003 Revenue            
(US $ bn)
audit firm
corporate jurisdiction
NED/Total Directors
Quick Ratio
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Total scoresa. 
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